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Contingent Capital in Executive 
Compensation 
Wulf A. Kaal* 
Abstract 
Contingent capital has great potential to improve corporate 
governance in Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(SIFIs). Early initiatives by European SIFIs to include contingent 
convertible bonds in executive compensation packages lack 
governance-improving designs. This Article suggests the use of 
contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger in 
executive compensation. The proposal adds an important element to 
the literature on inside debt and the creditor-centered approach to 
executive compensation. Contingent convertible bonds with early 
triggers could be preferable to other debt instruments because, in 
addition to lowering income inequality and increasing 
sustainability, the early trigger design can improve incentives for 
executives to lower risk-taking, improve signaling of default risk, and 
increase incentives for monitoring by creditors and shareholders. The 
recognition of ownership characteristics in design features adds an 
important element to the literature on contingent capital trigger 
designs. The methodological assumptions of incomplete contract 
theory can improve the analysis of executive compensation 
arrangements. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the financial crisis of 2008–2009 (Financial Crisis), 
existing executive compensation policies and the level of 
executive compensation have been increasingly scrutinized.1 
                                                                                                     
 1. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 61–66 (2011) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], http://fcic-static. 
law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf (investigating 
the causes of the financial and economic crisis of 2007–2010); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 
(2010) (explaining how banks’ executive pay has produced incentives for 
excessive risk-taking and how such pay should be reformed); Lucian A. Bebchuk 
& Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. 
L. 647, 649 (2005) (critiquing pay arrangements and corporate governance 
processes producing them); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming 
Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE 
J. ON REG. 359, 363 (2009) (suggesting that executive incentive compensation 
CONTINGENT CAPITAL 1823 
Lucian Bebchuk and his coauthors show in several pieces that 
existing executive compensation practices have resulted in 
suboptimal incentives for executives.2 The level of executive 
compensation in the United States3 and the focus on equity-based 
                                                                                                     
plans should consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock options); Claire 
Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of 
Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 369 (2009) (arguing that 
courts are not well equipped to deal with structural bias); Richard A. Posner, 
Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if Anything Should Be Done 
About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1026 (2009) (discussing the compensation of 
publicly owned U.S. company executives); Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of 
Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 196–97 (2011) (arguing that 
the Dodd–Frank Act did not adequately reform executive compensation 
schemes); Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Are Executives Paid Too 
Much?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A13 (analyzing how executives and 
managers should be paid to benefit companies’ long term health); Carola 
Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 16585, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 
16585 (surveying recent literature on CEO compensation).  
 2. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The 
Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–
2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (2010); see also Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, 
at 274–75 (arguing that because shareholders are incentivized to encourage 
management to take risks beyond the socially optimal level, corporate 
governance reforms should include reforms of executive compensation policies). 
Because of implicit government guarantees for bank debt, existing executive 
compensation policies do not incentivize bondholders and other creditors to 
monitor risk-taking by executives. Id. 
 3. According to a 2012 report by the Economic Policy Institute, CEO 
compensation grew more than 725% from 1978 to 2011, compared to 5.7% for 
worker compensation. LAWRENCE MISHEL & NATALIE SABADISH, ECON. POLICY 
INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 331, CEO PAY AND THE TOP 1%: HOW EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION AND FINANCIAL-SECTOR PAY HAVE FUELED INCOME INEQUALITY 4 
(2012), http://www.epi.org/files/2012/ib331-ceo-pay-top-1-per cent.pdf. The CEO–
worker compensation ratio in 2011 was 231.0-to-1 if stock options realized were 
counted, 209.4-to-1 if stock options granted were counted. Id. at 6. The Wall 
Street Journal/Hay Group CEO Compensation 2011 Study reveals that although 
pay levels flattened due to “say-on-pay” provisions, long-term equity grants were 
up 34% from 2010 levels. WALL ST. J. & HAY GROUP, 2011 CEO COMPENSATION 
STUDY SUMMARY 2 (2012), http://www.haygroup.com/downloads/ww/WSJ_ 
Hay_Group_2011_Study_Summary_Results_FINAL_5.20.12.pdf. According to 
Bebchuk and Grinstein, between 1993 and 2003 the aggregate compensation of 
the top five executives in the United States amounted to over $351 billion. 
Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD 
REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 283, 297 (2005), http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/ 
21/2/283.full.pdf+html. Over the same time period (1993–2003), executive 
compensation at S&P 500 firms rose on average from $3.7 million to $9.1 
million. Id. at 285. 
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compensation in executive pay packages may have resulted in 
inappropriate executive risk-taking,4 short-termism,5 a lack of 
sustainability, income inequality, and a classic moral hazard 
problem.6 
For more than three decades, theoretical research on 
executive compensation has focused almost exclusively on 
adjusting executive compensation with equity-based products 
alone, such as stocks and stock options.7 While equity-based 
compensation policies may increase risk-taking, some empirical 
studies have shown that risk-taking can decline if executives hold 
more debt relative to their equity holdings.8 An increasing part of 
                                                                                                     
 4. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 61–66 (discussing executive 
compensation as a cause of the Financial Crisis). 
 5. Id.  
 6. Executive remuneration via stock options resulted in executives 
sharing in shareholders’ gain but insulated them from shareholders’ losses. This 
may have led executives to use excessively risky strategies because there was no 
penalty for management. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 249–50 
(discussing the role of excessive risk-taking in the financial sector and its impact 
on the Financial Crisis); see also Bebchuk, Cohen & Spamann, supra note 2, at 
259 (analyzing executive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman from 2000–
2008); Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the 
Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 12 (2011) (arguing that the most plausible 
explanation for these findings is that CEOs “took actions that they believed the 
market would welcome,” but “[e]x post, these actions were costly to their 
banks”); Andrea Beltratti & Rene M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better 
During the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance 
and Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15180, 
2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15180.pdf.  
 7. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How 
Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–Jun. 1990, at 138 (showing that 
it is more important to focus on the form of executive compensation than the 
amount of compensation).  
 8. See Cory A. Cassell, Shawn X. Huang, Juan Manuel Sanchez & Michael 
D. Stuart, Seeking Safety: The Relation Between CEO Inside Debt Holdings and 
the Riskiness of Firm Investment and Financial Policies, 103 J. FIN. ECON. 588, 
599 (2012) (studying the relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the 
riskiness of firm investment and financial policies); Rangarajan K. Sundaram & 
David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial 
Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1553 (2007) (discussing the shift away from 
equity incentives and toward debt incentives as CEOs get older); Joseph 
Gerakos, CEO Pensions: Disclosure, Managerial Power, and Optimal 
Contracting 23 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2007-5, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982180 (finding that pension benefits may 
reduce risk-taking); Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt 
Compensation, and the Global Financial Crisis 18–19 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
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the literature is now considering the role of debt for manager 
incentives (the creditor-centered approach).9 Debt in executive 
compensation packages can help lower risk incentives, lower 
income inequality, address short-termism, and create 
sustainability.10 
The benefits of debt in executive compensation packages can 
be enhanced by using contingent convertible bonds (CCBs),11 
which can either be written down or converted into equity upon a 
triggering event.12 Unlike traditional contingent convertible 
                                                                                                     
Working Paper No. 11-49, 2011) [hereinafter Tung & Wang], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570161 (finding that banks with higher CEO debt–
equity ratios are likely to take less risk and perform better during a financial 
crisis than those with lower CEO debt–equity ratios); Chenyang Wei & David 
Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives (Fed. Reserve Bank 
of N.Y., Staff Report No. 445, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1604046 (noting that many studies have found that 
firms face a lower cost of debt when the CEO has a high ratio of inside-debt-to-
inside-equity compensation). Other studies reject the idea that executive 
compensation and risk-taking are correlated. See Fahlenbach & Stulz, supra 
note 6, at 12 (arguing that the link between incentive and risk-taking is not 
proven); Andrew C. W. Lund, Compensation as Signaling, 64 FLA. L. REV. 591, 
593 (2012) (stating that the interest in executives’ pay structure as related to 
concerns about risk-taking is misplaced); Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. 
Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 159, 183 (2010) (arguing that the 
prevailing view, which suggests altering executives’ compensation packages, 
may not be the solution to excessive risk-taking). 
 9. Bebchuk and Spamann propose tying executive pay to a specified 
percentage of the aggregate value of the common shares, the preferred shares, 
and the bonds issued by a bank or its holding company. Bebchuk & Spamann, 
supra note 1, at 253. John Coffee recommends using “contingent capital,” a debt 
security that converts to a fixed return preferred stock with cumulative 
arrearages and significant voting rights. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After 
Dodd–Frank : Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond 
Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 806 (2011). Hill and Painter argue that 
bankers should have some personal liability and suggest two approaches: 
mandatory partnership/joint venture agreements and assessable stock. Claire 
Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why 
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1173, 1175 (2010). Fred Tung suggests paying bankers partly with their 
banks’ public subordinated debt securities. Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker 
Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 15 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2011). 
 10. See generally Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1. 
 11. Other terms for contingent capital securities (CCSs) include contingent 
convertible bonds (CCBs), or CoCos. This Article will predominantly refer to 
these hybrid instruments as contingent convertible bonds or CCBs.  
 12. See CHARLES HIMMELBERG, AMANDA HINDLION, SANDRA LAWSON & 
1826 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821 (2012) 
bonds issued to investors, the emphasis for contingent convertible 
bonds in executive compensation is not on a capital infusion when 
the Systematically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) is in a 
crisis,13 but rather on governance-improving designs to help 
optimize management’s incentives.14 Adding contingent 
convertible bonds with an early trigger to the calibration of 
executive compensation packages could improve the corporate 
governance of SIFIs.15 More specifically, contingent convertible 
bonds with early triggers in executive compensation packages can 
help to improve incentives for risk-taking by executives, facilitate 
monitoring by creditors and shareholders, align executives’ 
interests with those of different constituents, promote 
sustainability, and reduce income inequality.16  
Using contingent convertible bonds with early triggers in 
executive compensation is not a mere theoretical proposal. 
                                                                                                     
LOUISE PITT, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL MKTS. INST., CONTINGENT CAPITAL: 
POSSIBILITIES, PROBLEMS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2011) [hereinafter GOLDMAN 
SACHS], http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatory-
reform/contingent-capital.pdf; STEVE STRONGIN, AMANDA HINDLION & SANDRA 
LAWSON, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL MKTS. INST., EFFECTIVE REGULATION: PART 5: 
ENDING “TOO BIG TO FAIL” 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter GOLDMAN SACHS TBTF], 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatory-reform/ef 
fect-reform-part-5.pdf (explaining the triggering process for contingent capital). 
 13. See George Pennacchi, Theo Vermaelen & Christian C.P. Wolff, 
Contingent Capital: The Case for COERCs 9 (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 
2010/89/FIN, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1656994 (explaining how COERC bonds work). 
 14. See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible 
Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 101 (2012) (summarizing the possible applications of 
contingent convertible bonds in corporate governance); see also Wulf A. Kaal & 
Christoph K. Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers, 49 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 221 (2012). The conversion feature of CCBs and the threat of 
dilution for equity holders could change the power structure, control dynamic, 
and dependencies within SIFIs. The market in contingent convertible bonds is 
slowly evolving. See infra Part VI.B. With increasing issuances, contingent 
capital design features will continue to develop. The efficient functioning of 
contingent capital designs could benefit from experimentation and a learning 
experience that takes into account corporate governance considerations. 
Combined with other corporate governance mechanisms, CCBs, as an internal 
institution-specific mechanism, could help fill the void left by regulators’ 
seeming inability to supervise financial institutions effectively. 
 15. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 807 (discussing how implementing an early 
trigger for conversion may deter excessive risk-taking). 
 16. See infra Part V.B.2. 
CONTINGENT CAPITAL 1827 
Barclays, Inc. (Barclays) has already issued contingent capital 
securities to its executives under its Contingent Capital Plan 
(CCP).17 Barclays’s CCP, however, does not allow for conversion 
from debt into equity, much less with an early trigger before any 
other contingent convertible bonds can be triggered. Barclays’s 
issuance seems to serve a mere signaling function, only 
marginally improves corporate governance, and leaves the 
incentives for executives untouched. The design adjustment 
proposed in this Article helps optimize the effectiveness and 
corporate governance improvements of contingent convertible 
bonds in executive compensation. 
This Article includes five Parts. Part II evaluates reform 
proposals for executive compensation policies before and after the 
enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act and demonstrates that the 
creditor-centered approach to executive compensation adds 
important elements to the debate on reform proposals. Part III 
introduces the concept of contingent capital securities, contingent 
capital’s quasi-public-good characteristics, and the possible 
application of contingent capital bonds for corporate governance 
improvements in SIFIs. Part IV shows that the relational 
elements in executive compensation contracts are inadequately 
acknowledged by classical contract theory and spot contract 
theory. The shortcomings in the analysis of executive 
compensation contracts under the classical contract model and 
spot contract model can be overcome with the methodological 
assumptions of the relational or incomplete contract model in 
New Institutional Economics. Part V introduces the idea of 
contingent capital bonds in executive compensation and 
highlights the design and governance shortcomings in Barclays’s 
Contingent Capital Plan. Part V shows that contingent 
convertible bonds with early triggers can add important elements 
to the literature on inside debt and the creditor-centered 
approach to executive compensation. The recognition of 
                                                                                                     
 17. See BARCLAYS, BARCLAYS PLC ANNUAL REPORT 2010 172 (2010) 
[hereinafter BARCLAYS ANNUAL REPORT], http://reports.barclays.com/ar10/files/ 
Annual_Report_2010.pdf (stating that 50% of the deferred incentive rewards 
will be contingent capital awards under the CCP); Megan Murphy & Jennifer 
Hughes, Barclays Causes a Stir with Cocos Plan, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at 
22 (discussing the issuance of contingent convertible bonds as part of employees’ 
bonuses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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ownership characteristics in design features also adds an 
important element to the literature on contingent capital trigger 
designs. 
II. Reform Proposals for Executive Compensation 
Corporate governance reform proposals after the Financial 
Crisis have recognized the importance of executive 
compensation.18 Although the effects of equity-based 
compensation are unclear and are the subject of a long 
academic debate,19 equity-based compensation predominates 
                                                                                                     
 18. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission lists executive compensation 
as one of the primary factors contributing to the crisis (among other factors such 
as lack of transparency, excessive borrowing, and high risk investments). FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 1, at xix, xxvi. Executive compensation takes a prominent 
role among other important factors (such as accounting, liquidity, and capital 
regulation) in the Financial Services Authority’s Turner Review in the United 
Kingdom. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO 
THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 80 (2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ 
turner_review.pdf (highlighting contributing factors and international 
approaches to banking reform).  
 19. See generally Christopher S. Armstrong & Rahul Vashishtha, Executive 
Stock Options, Differential Risk-Taking Incentives, and Firm Value, 104 J. FIN. 
ECON. 70 (2012); John M. Barron & Glen R. Waddell, Work Hard, Not Smart: 
Stock Options in Executive Compensation, 6 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 767 (2008); 
John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity 
Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 27 (2003); John E. 
Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation 
Broken?, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 97 (2005); Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1; 
Stephen Bryan, Robert Nash & Ajay Patel, Can the Agency Costs of Debt and 
Equity Explain the Changes in Executive Compensation During the 1990s?, 12 J. 
CORP. FIN. 516 (2006); James Cash Acrey, William R. McCumber & Thu Hien T. 
Nguyen, CEO Incentives and Bank Risk, 63 J. ECON. & BUS. 456 (2011); Ingolf 
Dittman, Ernst Maug & Dan Zhang, Restricting CEO Pay, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1200 
(2011); Frydman & Jenter, supra note 1; Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 
Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2002); 
Huasheng Gao, Optimal Compensation Contracts When Managers Can Hedge, 
97 J. FIN. ECON. 218 (2010); Mao-Wei Hung, Yu-Jane Lio & Chia-Fen Tsai, 
Managerial Personal Diversification and Portfolio Equity Incentives, 18 J. CORP. 
FIN. 38 (2012); Christine Hurt, Regulating Compensation, 6 ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BUS. L.J. 21 (2011); Li Jin, CEO Compensation, Diversification, and Incentives, 
66 J. FIN. ECON. 29 (2002); Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked 
Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock 
Options, 30 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2001); Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock: 
Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. 
FIN. 1367 (2000); Sepe, supra note 1; Wei & Yermack, supra note 8; Sudhakar 
CONTINGENT CAPITAL 1829 
executive compensation in the United States.20 The focus on 
equity-based compensation in executive compensation 
packages may have resulted in short-termism, suboptimal 
incentives for managers, a lack of sustainability, income 
inequality, and a classic moral hazard problem.21 The 
appropriate response to the shortcomings in equity-based 
executive compensation is debated among academics22 and 
                                                                                                     
Balachandran, Bruce Kogut & Hitesh Harnal, The Probability of Default, 
Excessive Risk, and Executive Compensation: A Study of Financial Service Firms 
from 1995–2008 (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper, Working Paper, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1914542; 
Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran & Joel Shapiro, Executive Compensation and 
Risk Taking (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 456, 2011), 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr456.pdf; Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial Firms: The 
Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay (Columbia Law Sch. & Eur. Governance 
Inst., Working Paper No. 373, 2010) [hereinafter Executive Compensation], 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633906.  
 20. See DANIEL A. COHEN, AIYESHA DEY & THOMAS Z. LYS, THE SARBANES–
OXLEY ACT OF 2002: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPENSATION STRUCTURE AND RISK-
TAKING INCENTIVES OF CEOS 29 (2004), http://leeds-faculty.colorado.edu/ 
Bhagat/SOX-CEO-Compensation-Investment.pdf (covering the period from 1992 
to 2003 and dividing compensation into fixed salary, bonuses, and options); 
Cassell et. al., supra note 8, at 597 (depicting CEO-to-firm debt–equity ratio); 
Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8, at 1553 (defining the ratio of equity-to-
inside-debt as benefit pensions and deferred compensation); Tung & Wang, 
supra note 8, at 13 (measuring debt as defined benefit pension and deferred 
compensation). 
 21. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 249–50 (discussing problems 
in bank executives’ pay, possible remedies, and government intervention); 
Bebchuk, Cohen & Spamann, supra note 2, at 259 (analyzing executive 
compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman from 2000–2008); Fahlenbrach & 
Stulz, supra note 6, at 12 (arguing that the most plausible explanation for these 
findings is that CEOs “took actions that they believed the market would 
welcome,” but “[e]x post, these actions were costly to their banks”); Beltratti &. 
Stulz, supra note 6, at 1–2 (investigating limitations for bank performance 
during the Financial Crisis). 
 22. See, e.g., Jennifer G. Hill, Regulating Executive Remuneration after the 
Global Financial Crisis: Common Law Perspectives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
EXECUTIVE PAY (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2012) (discussing 
the nexus between executive compensation and the Financial Crisis); Bebchuk 
& Spamann, supra note 1 (analyzing how banks’ compensation structures 
produced incentives for excessive risk-taking); see also Posner, supra note 1, at 
1040–41 (arguing that, while the Financial Crisis cannot be attributed directly 
to executive overcompensation, CEOs have an incentive to increase leverage 
because of compensation tied by stock options to share value, generous 
severance packages, etc.); FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xix (stating that 
“compensation systems—designed in an environment of cheap money, intense 
1830 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821 (2012) 
policy makers.23 The debate pre- and post- Dodd–Frank Act has 
been shaped by the apparent shortcomings in equity-based 
                                                                                                     
competition, and light regulation—too often rewarded the quick deal, the short-
term gain—without proper consideration of long-term consequences”). “Often, 
those systems encouraged the big bet—where the payoff on the upside could be 
huge and the downside limited. This was the case up and down the line—from 
the corporate boardroom to the mortgage broker on the street.” Id. But see 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 6, at 11–12 (investigating whether bank 
performance during the recent credit crisis is related to CEO incentives before 
the crisis and finding some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives 
were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no 
evidence that they performed better); Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 6, at 2–5 
(examining whether bank performance is related to bank-level governance, 
country-level governance, country-level regulation, and bank balance sheet and 
profitability characteristics before the crisis). 
 23. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND 
COMPENSATION PRACTICES: IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS (2009), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf (providing 
specific recommendations regarding world-wide standards for corporate pay 
structure, disclosure, and transparency); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: KEY FINDINGS AND MAIN 
MESSAGES 14–31 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/10/43056196.pdf 
(analyzing “major corporate governance weaknesses” and outlining “a set of key 
findings and main messages”); DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS 106–27 (2009), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf (examining corporate 
governance practices and the appropriate balance between restraints on financial 
institution boards and flexibility for those boards to make effective strategic 
business decisions); see also Remuneration Code, FIN. SERVS. AUTH., http:// 
www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/International/remuneration/index.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2012) (providing a listing of FSA materials on remuneration) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Remuneration Policies, EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/directors-remun/index_en. 
htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (listing European Union materials on directors’ 
remuneration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Paul Davies et 
al., European Company Law Experts’ Response to the European Commission’s 
Green Paper ‘The EU Corporate Governance Framework’ 9–12 (Working Paper, 
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1912548 
(suggesting that corporate governance should address three agency problems: 
(1) “those between the management . . . and the shareholders” where 
shareholdings are dispersed; (2) “those between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders” where shareholdings are concentrated; and (3) those between 
controllers and non-shareholder stakeholders); Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, §§ 951 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1), 952 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3), 954 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78j-4), 956 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641); COMM. OF EUROPEAN 
BANKING SUPERVISORS (CEBS), GUIDELINES ON REMUNERATION, POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES (2010), http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/Publications/Standards 
%20and%20Guidelines/2010/Remuneration/Guidelines.pdf (exploring the effect of 
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executive compensation, by experiences with Enron and other 
financial scandals, and by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, as well as by 
the Financial Crisis. Recent efforts to include debt-based 
instruments in executive compensation could help address many 
of the shortcomings in equity-based compensation.  
A. Pre Dodd–Frank Act 
There is some evidence that executive compensation played a 
role in governance shortcomings before the Enron scandal.24 
Despite this evidence, the regulatory response after the collapse 
of Enron focused predominantly on audit failure.25 Executive 
compensation was only marginally addressed in the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act (SOX).26 Increased shareholder involvement in 
                                                                                                     
remuneration, requirements on risk alignment and disclosure in the context of 
remuneration policies and practices); FIN. STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR 
SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES (2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard. 
org/publications/r_0904b.pdf (describing the FSF Principles for Sound 
Compensation Practices and how they apply to major financial institutions). 
 24. See John C. Coffee Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and 
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 273, 297–98 (2004) 
(discussing the Enron collapse and the economic incentives in the broader 
context of the society and culture of the 1990s). 
 25. See John C. Coffee Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge 
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302–62 (2004) (exploring 
the role of “gatekeepers,” or independent professionals who spend great effort to 
protect disparate investors who are unable to protect themselves from corporate 
or institutional abuse); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the 
Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial 
Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2002) (discussing Enron’s collapse 
and ramifications for the greater business world). 
 26. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. 
Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1079 (D. Ariz. 2010) (providing some clarification 
by requiring personal misconduct by the issuer, not the executive, to grant 
recovery under SOX § 304); Coffee, supra note 24, at 269–71 (considering 
executive compensation as a possible cause for the Enron scandal and the 
eventual collapse of Enron); Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay:” Cautionary Notes 
on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 323, 333–34 (2009) (discussing the lacking effectiveness of SOX § 304); 
Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary 
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1162–63, 1190–92 (2004) (describing 
shareholder approval of equity compensation plans under SOX and various 
NYSE and NASDAQ responses to SOX); Nathan Knutt, Executive Compensation 
Regulation: Corporate America, Heal Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 509 (2005) 
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executive compensation, director elections, and other corporate 
governance matters were notably absent from the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act. Reform proposals after the Enron scandal but before 
the Financial Crisis and the eventual enactment of the Dodd–
Frank Act focused in part on increasing shareholder involvement, 
linking compensation to executive performance, and optimizing 
transparency.  
Before the Financial Crisis and the enactment of the Dodd–
Frank Act that would eventually include provisions to enhance 
shareholder involvement, proposals for reform included attempts 
to establish say-on-pay plans requiring a stockholder vote on 
manager compensation.27 The United Kingdom implemented a 
say-on-pay scheme in 200228 and Germany began allowing 
                                                                                                     
(“The majority of Sarbanes-Oxley is not dedicated to executive compensation 
issues. . . .”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529, 1538 (2005) (criticizing SOX 
§ 402, which prohibits personal loans to directors and officers).   
 27. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 1, at 369; see also Randall S. Thomas, 
Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd–Frank’s Say on Pay: Will it Lead to a 
Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975866 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. See Gordon, supra note 26 (assessing hypothetical mandatory federal 
rule in the U.S. in light of the U.K. experience with a similar regulation adopted 
in 2002 and arguing for a federally mandated shareholder opt-in right to a “say 
on pay” regime, which would change the current reliance on “precatory 
proposals”); see generally Walid Alissa, Boards’ Response to Shareholders’ 
Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK (Working 
Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1412880 (examining how the U.K. regulation affected the actions of 
shareholders and boards and finding evidence that shareholders sometimes 
used their vote to convey dissatisfaction with excessive compensation); Martin J. 
Conyon & Graham V. Sadler, Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration 
Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK (AAA 2010 Mgmt. Acct. Sec. (MAS) 
Meeting Paper, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1457921 (investigating U.K. shareholder 
voting and finding that less than 10% of shareholders abstain or vote against 
the “mandated Directors’ Remuneration Report”); Fabrizio Ferri & David A. 
Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK, REV. 
FIN. (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420394 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (examining “say on pay” regulation in the U.K. and 
finding that the regulation’s announcement led to a positive stock price reaction 
at firms with weak penalties for undesirable performance) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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nonbinding votes on management compensation by shareholders 
during the annual meeting in 2010.29  
Other reform proposals before the enactment of the Dodd–
Frank Act focused on linking pay with executive performance. 
Proposals in this context included tying executive compensation 
to the entity’s performance by granting stock options,30 back 
loading executive compensation and tying it to the future 
performance of the company,31 prohibiting severance pay,32 and 
granting restricted stock with a mandatory holding period.33 
Other proposals to increase executive performance suggest a 
reduction in equity compensation and bonuses caused by 
industry-based movements and changes in the economy,34 
awarding bonuses only for accounting improvements that are 
sustained over time,35 and curtailing “soft-landing” 
arrangements.36  
Another major focus of reform proposals before the 
enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act had been transparency in the 
disclosure of executives’ compensation packages. Proposals to 
improve transparency included placing a dollar value on all 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Marc Steffen Rapp, Marco O. Sperling & Michael Wolff, Wer Fragt 
die Aktionäre?—Abstimmung über das Vorstandsvergütungssystem: 
Erfahrungen aus der HV-Saison 2010 [Who is Asking the Shareholders? Voting 
on Management Compensation in German Listed Firms—Evidence from the 
Annual Meeting Season 2010] (HHL Research Paper Series in Corp. Governance 
No. 2, Working Paper, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723155 (examining the determinants affecting the 
likelihood of voting and the result of the vote, and finding that the likelihood of 
voting increases with a higher free float and large media exposure and the 
introduction of a new remuneration system leads to a higher approval rate). 
 30. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305, 355–57 (1976); see also Frydman, supra note 1, at 5 (surveying recent 
literature on CEO compensation). 
 31. Posner, supra note 1, at 1045.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1, at 363; Samuelson & Stout, supra note 
1, at A13. 
 34. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 669.  
 35. Id. at 670. 
 36. See id. at 671–72 (stating that these arrangements “provide generous 
compensation for executives being pushed out due to failure” and narrow “the 
payoff gap between good and poor performance”). 
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elements of executive compensation37 and disclosing the value in 
SEC filings,38 disclosing sales of equity instruments,39 disclosing 
nondeductible compensation,40 appointing a compensation 
representative to represent shareholder interests in setting 
executive pay,41 and appointing a “high-quality” compensation 
committee consisting of experienced, independent members.42  
B. Post Dodd–Frank Act 
Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Act43 as a response to the 
Financial Crisis. The Act adopted many of the suggestions from 
the precrisis literature on executive compensation and added 
other safeguards. The Dodd–Frank Act’s provisions pertaining to 
executive compensation provide for a nonbinding shareholder 
vote to approve executive compensation,44 disclosure of 
relationship between executive compensation and the financial 
                                                                                                     
 37. Posner, supra note 1, at 1045.  
 38. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 668. 
 39. Id. at 668–69.   
 40. Id. at 668.  
 41. Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation Representatives: A Prudent 
Solution to Excessive CEO Pay, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 449, 473–74 (2007).  
 42. Jerry Sun & Steven Cahan, The Effect of Compensation Committee 
Quality on the Association Between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting 
Performance, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 193, 194 (2009) (stating that 
empirical evidence has shown that compensation committees can prevent 
executives from behaving opportunistically); see also Patricia M. Dechow, Mark 
R. Huson & Richard G. Sloan, The Effect of Restructuring Charges on Executives’ 
Cash Compensation, 69 ACCT. REV. 138, 139 (1994); Memorandum from 
Jeannemarie O’Brien, David E. Kahan & Samuel E. Eckman, SEC Issues Final 
Dodd–Frank Rules on Independence of Compensation Committee and Its 
Advisers (June 21, 2012) (discussing compensation committee independence, 
advisor independence, disclosure, and exemptions) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); SEC Listing Standards For Compensation Committees, 
17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 240 (2012) (directing the national securities exchanges to bar 
the listing of any equity securities of a company not in compliance with the 
compensation committee and compensation adviser requirements of Section 10C 
of the Exchange Act).  
 43. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
7, 12, 15, 22, 31 & 42 U.S.C.). 
 44. Id. § 951.  
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performance of the entity,45 disclosure of the annual total 
compensation of the CEO and the relationship to the median 
annual compensation of employees,46 disclosure of hedging 
behavior,47 claw-back provisions,48 an independent compensation 
committee,49 and prohibition of compensation arrangements that 
encourage inappropriate risks50 or could lead to material financial 
loss to the financial institution.51 
The post-Dodd–Frank Act-reform debate is predominated by 
dissension over say-on-pay provisions.52 Critics argue that 
shareholder voting on executive compensation could actually hurt 
shareholders because it diffuses responsibility regarding 
compensation and insulates directors’ reputations.53 With say-on-
pay provisions in place, directors may be incentivized to authorize 
larger compensation packages that are less sensitive to 
performance.54 Moreover, shareholders may lack the incentives 
and resources to evaluate the information and may not be able to 
determine whether executive pay is reasonable.55 Say-on-pay 
provisions could give proxy advisory firms more power.56 
                                                                                                     
 45. Id. § 953(a)(i). 
 46. Id. § 953(b). 
 47. Id. § 955.  
 48. Id. § 954(b).  
 49. Id. § 952. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. § 956(a)(1)(B).  
 52. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro & Stephanie M. Greene, “Say on Pay:” The 
Movement to Reform Executive Compensation in the United States and European 
Union, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 593, 593 (2011) (describing U.S. and European 
Union reform efforts in the context of executive compensation); Memorandum 
from Michael J. Segal, UK Government Announces Binding Vote on Executive 
Compensation (June 21, 2012) (discussing the differences in say-on-pay 
provisions in the U.K. and U.S.) (on file with author and with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 53. Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive 
Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 417, 418 (2011). 
 54. See id. (proposing an opt-out of the say-on-pay regime by shareholder 
vote). 
 55. Tiffany Roddenberry, Say-on-Pay: Cautionary Notes on the Use of Third 
Party Compensation Guidelines in the United States, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 933, 
933 (2011); see also Gordon, supra note 26, at 325.  
 56. Gordon, supra note 26, at 325.  
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To remedy the shortcomings, some suggest that Congress 
give shareholders a right to opt into a binding vote on the board’s 
pay scheme,57 while others suggest that shareholders should have 
a right to decide whether a public firm should schedule a vote on 
executive compensation,58 information disclosed should include 
details on the pay of executives at competitor companies,59 and 
shareholders should have a right to decide whether a public firm 
should schedule a vote on executive compensation.60  
Despite its many critics,61 say-on-pay may have led to 
improvements. As a result of say-on-pay requirements, some 
firms may have reduced compensation and increased 
performance measures for executive compensation.62 Because 
poorly performing companies with high pay levels can expect 
shareholder dissent, say-on-pay may attract strong shareholder 
support.63 Shareholders may perceive compensation procedures 
as fairer under say-on-pay, which could increase shareholder 
confidence in an entity’s board of directors and increased investor 
interest in the entity.64 
                                                                                                     
 57. Andrew L. Bethune, An Efficient “Say” on Executive Pay: Shareholder 
Opt-In as a Solution to the Managerial Power Problem, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 585, 
589, 610 (2011). 
 58. Gordon, supra note 26, at 326 (arguing that this regime would focus 
attention on firms with the most questionable practices). 
 59. Roddenberry, supra note 55, at 934, 952.  
 60. Gordon, supra note 26, at 326 (arguing that this regime would focus 
attention on firms with the most questionable practices, enabling successful 
implementation to be observed by similar firms and possibly causing them to 
change their behavior).  
 61. For a summary of criticism on say-on-pay provisions in the Dodd–
Frank Act, see Roddenberry, supra note 55, at 940; Bethune, supra note 57, at 
610–14. 
 62. Steven Balsam & Jennifer Yin, The Impact of Say-on-Pay on Executive 
Compensation 4 (Working Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026121. 
 63. See id. (“In this paper we find affected firms reduce their compensation, 
with that decrease being greater for firms that overpaid their CEOs in prior 
periods. We also find evidence that they increased their use of performance-
based compensation.”). 
 64. Kendall Bowlin, Margaret H. Christ & Jeremy B. Griffin, Say-on-Pay 
and the Differential Effects of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Regimes on Investor 
Perceptions and Behavior (AAA 2011 Mgmt. Acct. Sec. (MAS) Meeting Paper, 
Working Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1659862.  
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C. The Creditor-Centered Approach 
Executive compensation in the United States mostly takes the 
form of equity-based instruments. Changes to the tax code and other 
regulation encourage equity-based compensation for executives.65 
The justification of executive compensation with equity-based 
products has been a major focus of theoretical research on executive 
compensation in the past three decades.66 However, an increasing 
part of the literature is now considering the role of debt for manager 
incentives,67 and empirical studies show that risk-taking can decline 
if executives hold more debt relative to their equity holdings.68  
Bebchuk and Spaman show that a compensation package that 
includes a basket of securities representing a predefined percentage 
of the aggregate value of all outstanding bonds, preferred shares, 
and common shares could help address the shortcomings of existing 
executive compensation practices.69 Tying executive compensation 
to this basket of securities issued by either the bank holding 
company or the bank70 can improve incentives for executives to 
                                                                                                     
 65. See, e.g., 26 I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006); Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, 
Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1921 (2010); 
COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, TOP 10 RED FLAGS TO WATCH FOR WHEN 
CASTING AN ADVISORY VOTE ON EXECUTIVE PAY 2–4 (2010), http://www.cii.org/ 
UserFiles/file/resource%20center/publications/March%202010%20-%20Say%20 
on%20Pay%20Checklist.pdf. 
 66. See generally Jensen & Murphy, supra note 7 (showing that it is more 
important to focus on the form of executive compensation than the amount of 
compensation). 
 67. See generally Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1; Tung, supra note 9; 
Hill & Painter, supra note 9.  
 68. See generally Tung & Wang, supra note 8; Wei & Yermack, supra note 
8; Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8, at 1553; see also Gerakos, supra note 8, 
at 23 (finding that pension benefits may reduce risk-taking).  
 69. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 253, 283–84. How the 
securities in the basket should be weighted is unclear. Weighting debt 
securities, including contingent convertible bonds, heavily in the calibration of 
executive compensation may increase the positive effects of debt in executive 
compensation packages. At the same time, debt may not be the preferred form of 
compensation for executives. Calibrating executive compensation packages to 
account for desired incentives and governance improvements while giving 
sufficient incentives for executives to perform within expected parameters could 
require an institution specific relational approach and a learning process for 
institutions. See discussion supra Part IV (reviewing the benefits of the 
incomplete contract theory of New Institutional Economics (NIE)). 
 70. Id. 
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consider the losses that risk-taking could impose on shareholders, 
bondholders, depositors, and taxpayers.71 Regulators could place 
constraints on the pay schemes to shape how executives choose the 
actions that are allowed by direct regulation.72 Moreover, bonuses 
could be based not only on earnings per share, but rather on broader 
metrics that also reflect the interests of preferred shareholders, 
bondholders, and the government as guarantor of deposits.73 Hill 
and Painter suggest mandatory partnership or joint venture 
agreements and assessable stock to ensure that bankers have some 
personal liability.74 This personal liability could improve creditor 
protection because executives would be exposed to some downside 
risk and would be disincentivized from taking excessive risks.75 
The literature on inside debt similarly emphasizes creditor 
protection. Inside debt in the form of deferred compensation and 
pension plans, among other instruments, can help optimize 
managers’ incentives and serves an important function in the 
calibration of executive compensation packages.76 Fred Tung 
suggests using public subordinated debt securities for part of the 
compensation of bank executives.77 Debt and equity hold different 
risk preferences, and creditors’ preferences for more conservative 
management strategies can help curb managers’ risk-taking.78 
                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 247, 253, 283–84. 
 72. Id. at 253. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Hill & Painter, supra note 9, at 1174–75. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8, at 1552 (arguing that inside 
debt alters managerial incentives). This in turn alters the size of the firm’s 
payouts, the composition of these payouts (dividends versus share repurchases), 
the firm’s cost of debt and its capital structure, the choice of new securities to be 
issued (debt versus equity), project choice, capital expenditure choice, and the 
incentive to pursue diversifying mergers, among many other things; and 
discussing whether and under what conditions such debt holdings could be part 
of an optimal compensation package. Id. 
 77. Tung, supra note 9.  
 78. Id. at 1212–13; see also Rosalind L. Bennett, Levent Güntay & Haluk 
Unal, Inside Debt, Bank Default Risk and Performance during the Crisis 23–25 
(FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2012-3, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2122619 (stating that in 
bank holding companies, a CEO’s lower holdings of inside debt relative to equity 
had an association with higher default risk and worse performance during the 
crisis period).  
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Inside debt in the form of defined benefit plans can make executives 
sensitive to firm value in bankruptcy, which is desired by 
creditors.79 Measured by an entity’s distance from default, aligning 
managers’ interests with creditors’ can reduce a firm’s risk of 
defaulting80 and improve its credit rating.81 Debt should be part of 
executive compensation because it is an efficient deterrent against 
risk-shifting.82  
                                                                                                     
 79. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey 
of New Optimal Contracting Theories, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 486, 493 (2009); see 
also Reilly S. White, Inside Debt and Firm Dividend Policy 1, 26 (Working 
Paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2054787 (“Managers with high pension holdings will be more reluctant to 
commit to high dividend policy that can risk their future pension payouts.”). 
“These findings provide support to the manager-owner agency theory, where 
executive pensions can act as ‘counter options’, and therefore align executive 
interests away from shareholders towards bondholders.” Id.  
 80. Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8. 
 81. Gerakos, supra note 8, at 11–12. 
 82. Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside Debt, 15 REV. FIN. 75, 77–78, 91 (2011) 
(justifying the use of debt as efficient compensation and arguing that a debt bias 
can improve effort as well as deter risk-shifting); see also Riccardo Calcagno & 
Luc Renneboog, The Incentive to Give Incentives: On the Relative Seniority of 
Debt Claims and Managerial Compensation, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 1795, 1795, 
1809 (2007) (arguing that the increase in the leverage of Anglo-American 
corporations has stimulated the interest in the role of debt as a direct incentive 
device for management to generate stronger corporate performance); Tung & 
Wang, supra note 8, at 5 (“Our empirical evidence provides a rationale for the 
use of inside debt compensation in structuring executive compensation in the 
banking context.”); Cassell et al., supra note 8, at 588 (stating that “CEO inside 
debt holdings . . . are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm,” 
and therefore expose “the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside 
creditors,” and arguing that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display 
lower levels of risk-seeking behavior); Sallie Krawcheck, Four Ways to Fix 
Banks, 90 HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 109 (2012) (suggesting paying top executives 
with debt instead of equity-based compensation to give them more incentive to 
worry about risk); Hernan Ortiz-Molina, Executive Compensation and Capital 
Structure: The Effects of Convertible Debt and Straight Debt on CEO Pay, 43 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 69, 71 (2007) (arguing that the hypothesis that debt reduces 
manager–shareholder conflicts can explain some but not all of the results); Alex 
Edmans, How to Fix Executive Compensation: For Starters, Don’t Link Pay 
Packages Just to Stock; Tie Them to Debt as Well, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2012, at 
R.1 (advocating for the inclusion of debt in executive compensation packages in 
order to reduce risk-taking); Bolton, Mehran & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 34 
(presenting evidence that the market believes that “including debtlike 
instruments in CEO compensation packages will reduce risk” for financial 
institutions); see generally Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: 
Why CEOs Should Be Compensated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (2007) 
(proposing a novel bankruptcy compensation plan, otherwise known as debt 
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The creditor-centered approach to executive compensation has 
encountered some critics who argue that inside debt can be 
inefficient and may not influence executives’ conduct sufficiently 
while creating complicated incentive structures.83 Other criticisms 
include allegations of too strong a focus on the banking sector and 
managers’ ability to manipulate book value as the only available 
measure of asset value.84 Critics have also attacked the creditor-
centered approach on methodological grounds because they assume 
that the principal–agent relationship in that approach is a one-shot 
transaction rather than a relational contract.85 Given the 
shortcomings pointed out by the debate, some call for a paradigm 
shift to overcome the unnecessary creation of new remuneration 
narratives.86 
III. Contingent Capital 
Contingent convertible bonds (CCBs) are debt securities that 
can either be written down or converted into equity upon a 
triggering event.87 The many applications and benefits of contingent 
convertible bonds88 include their ability to stabilize and prepare 
                                                                                                     
compensation, that is expected to provide better incentives for CEOs to perform 
efficiently). 
 83. Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, Is Inside Debt Efficient? Theory and 
New Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation 49–50 (Bos. 
Coll. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 266, 2012), J. CORP. L. 
(forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038528 (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 84. Sepe, supra note 1, at 210–11. 
 85. Id. at 193, 211–12.  
 86. Jaap W. Winter, Corporate Governance Going Astray: Executive 
Remuneration Built to Fail, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70. 
GEBURTSTAG, 1521–35 (Stefan Grundmann, Brigitte Haar & Hanno Merkt eds., 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1792483 
(arguing that regulation of performance-based executive compensation will fail 
to solve system-wide problems due to inherent flaws in human behavior, and 
proposing alternative compensation structures that decrease the significance of 
remuneration, focus compensation comparisons internally, and reduce variable 
pay while calling for greater shareholder involvement in company operations). 
 87. GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 12, at 6. 
 88. See Kaal, supra note 14 (summarizing the benefits of contingent 
convertible bonds). 
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SIFIs for future financial crises,89 signal default risk,90 prevent 
bailouts,91 decrease risk-taking,92 minimize moral hazard,93 
incentivize the increase in capital,94 internalize bank failure 
                                                                                                     
 89. See Mark J. Flannery, Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with 
Contingent Capital Certificates 21–22 (Working Paper, 2009) [hereinafter 
Flannery, Stabilizing], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1485689 (pointing out that automatic conversion of contingent 
capital debt diminishes probability of future financial loss); Mark J. Flannery, 
No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via “Reverse Convertible 
Debentures” 24–25 (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Flannery, 
No Pain], http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/flannery/No%20Pain,%20No%20Gain. 
pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (arguing that contingent capital will increase 
firms’ financial leverage through automatic loss absorption) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 90. See Raghuram Rajan, More Capital Will Not Stop the Next Crisis, FIN. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at 9 (suggesting that contingent convertible bonds should be 
used to raise capital “when regulators see a crisis coming”); William C. Dudley, 
President & CEO, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Institute of 
International Bankers Membership Luncheon: Some Lessons from the Crisis 
(Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2009/dud 
091013.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (proposing that contingent capital can 
be used to adequately capture risk) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 91. Coffee, supra note 9, at 803–06 (promoting contingent capital as an 
alternative to bailouts); Squam Lake Working Grp. on Fin. Regulation, An 
Expedited Resolution Mechanism for Distressed Financial Firms: Regulatory 
Hybrid Securities 2, 4 (Council on Foreign Relations: Ctr. for Geoeconomic 
Studies, Working Paper, 2009) [hereinafter Squam Lake Working Grp.], 
available at http://www.cfr.org/economics/expedited-resolution-mechanism-
distressed-financial-firms-regulatory-hybrid-securities/p19002 (suggesting that 
hybrid securities would help prevent bailouts); Charles W. Calomiris & Richard 
J. Herring, Why and How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement 
39 (Working Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1815406 (averring that contingent capital could help prevent the 
“too big to fail” problem). 
 92. Pennacchi et al., supra note 13, at 36; Dudley, supra note 90 (asserting 
that because bank difficulties would trigger conversion, the dilution of 
shareholders creates an incentive for bank managers to “manage not only for 
good outcomes on the upside of the boom, but also against bad outcomes on the 
downside”). 
 93. See Flannery, No Pain, supra note 89, at 15 (“Frequent trigger 
evaluations eliminate moral hazard incentives and . . . [result in] surprisingly 
low default risk.”).  
 94. See Squam Lake Working Grp., supra note 91, at 3–4 (arguing that 
conversion of contingent capital bonds would quickly recapitalize banks); 
Calomiris & Herring supra note 91, at 39 (“A proper CoCos requirement can 
provide strong incentives for the prompt recapitalization of banks after 
significant losses of equity.”).  
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cost,95 avoid financial contagion,96 and “limit systemic risk.”97 As a 
hybrid instrument, contingent convertible bonds combine the limited 
upside of debt in the form of the coupon rate with the unlimited 
downside risk of equity, i.e., the total loss of the investment. Several 
successful contingent convertible bond issuances in Europe with 
coupon rates between 7% and 9.5% show that these securities 
can display a combination of features that investors and issuers 
find attractive.98 The market in contingent convertible bonds is 
slowly evolving.99 Because contingent convertible debt has 
many applications and could help reform policy in many areas, 
the concept finds increasing support among academics100 and policy  
                                                                                                     
 95. Flannery, Stabilizing, supra note 89, at 12 (calling contingent capital 
securities an “alternative to government absorption of private losses”); Robert L. 
McDonald, Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger 2 (Working Paper, 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553430 (“[Contingent Capital] 
reduces the debt load for poorly-performing institutions . . . but permits 
individual banks to fail in good times.”). 
 96. See GOLDMAN SACHS TBTF, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that if the 
appropriate triggers are in place, it could prevent bank runs—though if the 
trigger is based on market prices, it could worsen bank runs); see also Darrell 
Duffie, Contractual Methods for Out-Of-Court Restructuring of Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions 5 (Hoover Inst., Working Papers on Econ. 
Pol’y, 2009), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 
06EndingGovernmentBailoutsAsWeKnowThemDuffie.pdf (describing how 
conversion of contingent capital debt could “forestall . . . a liquidity crisis”). 
 97. Kaal, supra note 14, at 105; see also Coffee, supra note 9, at 806 
(proposing use of contingent capital securities to reduce “pressure on corporate 
managers to accept greater risk and leverage”). 
 98. Kaal, supra note 14, at 134–36.  
 99. Id. at 136 (acknowledging a “lack of regulatory guidance”).  
 100. See id.; DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE 
DODD–FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 84–85 (2011) (noting 
that the Dodd–Frank Act instructs the General Accountability Office to conduct 
a study on contingent capital and to begin using it when the study is completed); 
Coffee, supra note 9, at 839; Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14; Pennacchi et al., 
supra note 13, at 36; Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Fear of Fire 
Sales and the Credit Freeze 28 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 
305, 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/work305.pdf (“[C]ontingent capital is like 
installing sprinklers . . . . [W]hen the fire threatens, the sprinklers will turn 
on.”); Flannery, No Pain, supra note 89, at 15. But see Christian Koziol & 
Jochen Lawrenz, Contingent Convertibles: Solving or Seeding the Next Banking 
Crisis?, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 90, 91 (2012) (explaining that in situations 
involving incomplete contracts, contingent convertible bonds may subject banks 
to greater financial distress); Duffie, supra note 96, at 5 (stating that contingent 
convertible bonds are “unlikely to stop a [bank’s] liquidity crisis once it begins”); 
McDonald, supra note 95, at 20–21 (describing situations where contingent 
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makers.101 
Contingent convertible triggering events for conversion from 
debt into equity are typically intended to avert a financial 
weakening of the entity.102 The automatic conversion from debt into 
equity helps increase capital when needed and lowers the debt–to–
equity ratio.103 The automatic conversion of debt into equity may 
prove especially attractive to SIFIs who could otherwise be forced 
into restructuring.104 Because of the importance of the conversion 
feature of contingent convertible bonds for purposes of corporate 
governance improvements, the analysis in this Article will focus on 
                                                                                                     
capital fails to convert). 
 101. See COMM’N OF EXPERTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS 
FOR LIMITING THE ECONOMIC RISKS POSED BY LARGE COMPANIES 59–60 (2010), 
http://www.sif.admin.ch/dokumentation/00514/00519/00592/index.html?lang=en 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (proposing the conversion of contingent capital upon 
certain triggering events) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke, in a Bow to Critics of Fed’s Role, Supports 
Forming a Regulatory Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at B3 (stating that 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, opined that giant financial 
players might be forced to adopt “contingent” capital, and noting that contingent 
capital is “gaining popularity within the Fed”); Daniel K. Tarullo, Fed. Res. 
Governor, Speech at the Exchequer Club in Washington, D.C. to the Federal 
Reserve: Confronting Too Big to Fail (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20091021a.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 
2012) (commenting that contingent capital offers “significant promise of 
injecting market discipline into the firm”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). For a description of the policy in the European Union, see Press 
Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Wants Stronger and More Responsible 
Banks in Europe (July 20, 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=IP/11/915&type=HTML (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“The proposal 
will require banks to hold more and better capital to resist future shocks by 
themselves . . . . With its proposal, the Commission translates in Europe 
international standards on bank capital agreed at the G20 level (most commonly 
known as the Basel III agreement).”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 102. Coffee, supra note 9, at 805; Duffie, supra note 96, at 4–5; Flannery, 
Stabilizing, supra note 89, at 3.  
 103. See AMAR BHIDÉ, A CALL FOR JUDGMENT: SENSIBLE FINANCE FOR A 
DYNAMIC ECONOMY 291 (2010) (offering a proposal aimed at reducing risk-taking 
by amending current financial regulations to allow unregulated financial 
institutions to raise debt or equity, “but not on a short-term basis from the 
public or regulated fiduciaries”); Coffee, supra note 9, at 805 (averring that 
contingent capital can counter-leverage debt). 
 104. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 234 (stating that “conversion of 
debt into equity could be an attractive alternative” for struggling financial 
institutions); Coffee, supra note 9, at 805 (“By definition, such a conversion [of 
contingent capital debt] averts . . . bankruptcy . . . .”). 
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contingent convertible bonds with a conversion feature rather than 
a write-down.  
Contingent convertible bonds have quasi-public good 
characteristics105 and are particularly suitable for purposes of 
corporate governance improvements in SIFIs.106 The conversion 
feature of these securities may have the ability to influence 
corporate governance in SIFIs.107 If sufficient volumes of contingent 
convertible bond issuances are combined with adequate design 
features, the conversion feature of contingent convertible bonds and 
the threat of dilution of equity positions in SIFIs could affect 
corporate governance in SIFIs.108 Measures to increase the 
effectiveness of the conversion feature of contingent capital, such as 
increased voting rights or sequential triggers, could further increase 
the impact these securities may have on corporate governance.109  
In part because of mounting pressure from politicians, policy 
makers, and legislators who demanded remedies for corporate 
governance shortcomings, European SIFIs have issued contingent 
convertible bonds.110 Contingent convertible bonds’ potential to 
address corporate governance shortcomings, albeit not fully utilized 
in the existing designs, may help with public relations because a 
contingent convertible bond issuance may signal to investors, 
politicians, and the general public that SIFI management is 
instituting safety-increasing measures that can help avoid future 
bailouts. Although the designs of recent contingent convertible 
bond issuances provide mostly for a write-down feature rather 
than a conversion to equity, the SIFIs who issued contingent 
convertible bonds seem to have recognized the market acceptance 
and investor demand for these hybrid securities. The market in 
                                                                                                     
 105. Kaal, supra note 14, at 140. 
 106. Id. at 140, 146. 
 107. Id. at 144. 
 108. Id. at 145. 
 109. See id. at 144–46 (outlining how contingent capital debt could be 
utilized to increase voting rights); Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 255–56 
(explaining how sequential triggers could “increase voting rights for holders of 
contingent capital”). 
 110. Kaal, supra note 14, at 125–26 (summarizing Swiss efforts to 
implement contingent capital rules and how these efforts precipitated Credit 
Suisse’s voluntary issuances of contingent convertible bonds); see also GOLDMAN 
SACHS, supra note 12, at 18 (comparing the “few ‘loss absorbing’ securities . . . 
issued in the European market”). 
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contingent convertible bonds, however, is still in its infancy, and 
privately negotiated contingent convertible bond sales have so far 
not resulted in efficiently functioning contingent convertible bond 
designs that take corporate governance considerations into 
account. It is doubtful if market solutions and private ordering 
alone will produce contingent capital designs that help improve 
corporate governance in SIFIs. 
IV. Incomplete Contract Theory 
This Article expands the existing literature on the creditor-
centered approach to executive compensation by recommending 
the inclusion of contingent convertible bonds in the calibration of 
executives’ compensation packages. Scholarly contributions in the 
context of the creditor-centered approach to executive 
compensation are often (implicitly) based on the classical contract 
model or the spot contract model.111 This can result in suboptimal 
and unrealistic outcomes. The classical contract model assumes a 
system of rules that deals with and legally guarantees all future 
eventualities. The parties to a contract negotiate and agree ex 
ante on all possible scenarios and eventually execute the contract 
as agreed. The contract in this model hopes to anticipate all 
eventualities and is not intended to be ambiguous.112 The model 
assumes that the comprehensive nature of the regulation leaves 
no discretion to the agents, making opportunistic behavior 
impossible. Transaction costs in the form of initiating, concluding 
                                                                                                     
 111. Many scholars who endorse the creditor-centered approach to executive 
compensation may implicitly use the classical- or spot-contract model of 
executive compensation. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 255–56 
(examining banks’ incentive for risk-taking using only two periods: “the present, 
when managers make decisions, and the future, when gains or losses are 
realized and the manager gets paid” because using multiple periods for the 
analysis unnecessarily complicates the analysis without changes in the 
conclusions or other substantial benefits); Gordon, supra note 26, at 332–39 
(explaining that shareholders now have more corporate governance power to 
push for “pay for performance” executive compensation); Hill & Painter, supra 
note 9, at 1175, 1186–95; Sepe, supra note 1, at 211–12 (summarizing the 
issues). 
 112. Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 755 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman 
eds., 1989). 
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and enforcing the contract are not considered in the classical 
contract model. 
Contrary to the assumptions of the classical contract model 
and the spot contract model, executive contracts have an informal 
relational dimension that goes beyond the written contract 
between the parties. The relationship between the executive as 
agent and the corporation and its shareholders as principal 
involves more than the contractual terms of the agreement. An 
executive compensation contract combines elements of a 
knowledge exchange and relational collaboration. Informal 
relational behavior between the principal and agent generates 
confidence in the relationship, creates institution-specific 
knowledge, and provides innovative capabilities. The informal 
relational elements of executive compensation contracts can often 
overshadow the legal terms of the agreement. Using a model for 
the analysis of executive contracts that is based on the single 
contract between the executive–agent and corporation–principal 
would ignore the informal relational element of this principal–
agent relationship. Given the importance of the informal 
relational element of executive compensation contracts, the 
literature on the debt-centered approach to executive 
compensation should include informal relational-, behavioral-, 
and incomplete-contract theories.  
These shortcomings in the analysis of executive 
compensation contracts under the classical contract model and 
spot contract model can be overcome with the relational or 
incomplete contract model in New Institutional Economics 
(NIE).113 NIE is a relatively young offspring of economic theory 114 
and shares core assumptions with the neoclassical model, such as 
                                                                                                     
 113. Rudolf Richter, Banking Regulation as Seen by the New Institutional 
Economics, in 2 THE ECONOMICS AND LAW OF BANKING REGULATION 136 (Eirik G. 
Furubotn & Rudolf Richter eds., 1989). 
 114. NIE’s assumptions are increasingly used in modern economic analysis 
of financial markets and financial rules. See, e.g., HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND 
GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INVESTING 9–10 (2002) (pointing out that studying “behavioral phenomena” is 
integral to understanding inefficient markets); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT 
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 10 (2000) (stressing that 
investors are often irrational, that they “deviate from the standard decision 
making model in a number of fundamental areas,” and that they do not behave 
as would be expected under traditional theories that rely on efficient markets). 
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methodological individualism, scarcity of resources, and self-
interested rational behavior.115 NIE, however, substitutes the 
assumption of full rationality with bounded rationality116 and 
opportunistic behavior,117 and underscores that information is 
systematically incomplete.118 NIE emphasizes the functioning, 
development, and improvement of institutions.119 Institutions are 
defined as general rules or sets of general rules, together with 
their enforcement mechanisms.120 NIE emphasizes the 
importance of informal institutions, such as social norms.121 
Because corporate governance issues often involve formal and 
informal institutions, NIE is ideally suited to examine the 
efficiency of governance structures. Experimentation, 
observation, and rule revision in NIE’s model are part of a 
                                                                                                     
 115. EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3–5, 7 (2d ed. 
2005). 
 116. See STEFAN VOIGT, INSTITUTIONENÖKONOMIK [INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS] 
22–23 (2d ed. 2009). 
 117. Id. at 88–89; FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 115, at 5. 
 118. See VOIGT, supra note 116, at 237–38. 
 119. See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 115, at 35–37 (describing the 
subfields of modern NIE research); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) (outlining the 
author’s belief that studying institutional change is essential to understanding 
economic theory and “the way societies evolve through time”); RUDOLF RICHTER 
& EIRIK G. FURUBOTN, NEUE INSTITUTIONENÖKONOMIK 1 [NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS] (3d ed. 2003); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM 16 (1985) (“The changing character of economic organization over 
time . . . is of particular interest to [transaction cost economics and NIE].”); 
VOIGT, supra note 116; Christian Kirchner, Public Choice and New Institutional 
Economics: A Comparative Analysis in Search of Co-operation Potentials, in 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC CHOICE 19, 25–26, 32 (Pio Baake & Rainald 
Borck eds., 2007) (explaining that NIE examines how institutional changes and 
transaction costs affect behavior, and calling institutions the “core elements of 
the functions of markets”); Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 
AM. ECON. REV. 72, 72–74 (1998) (describing how NIE examines transaction 
costs and their effect on institutional behavior and improvements); Oliver E. 
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 233 (1979) (“The new institutional economics is 
preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction costs.”). 
 120. See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 115, at 7 (“[A]n institution will be 
defined as a set of formal and informal rules, including their enforcement 
arrangements.”); VOIGT, supra note 116. 
 121. See VOIGT, supra note 116 (recognizing that limiting the analysis to a 
subset of formal institutions would ignore important problems). 
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continuous process that avoids “optimal” or “stable” rules.122 
Experimentation can result in a learning process that can 
improve the quality of governance structures. Because it is likely 
that underlying economic conditions will change, contingent 
convertible bond offerings to the public and to executives may 
benefit from a process of experimentation and learning.  
In contrast to classical contract analysis, NIE’s incomplete 
contract model recognizes that contracts are inevitably 
incomplete and rely on control rights to minimize opportunistic 
behavior.123 This model takes opportunistic behavior and 
transaction costs into account.124 The degree of contractual 
incompleteness is influenced by the cost of contracting and 
contracting parties’ ability to anticipate opportunistic behavior.125 
The theory of incomplete contracts under NIE can be considered 
part of the principal–agent approach because information before 
and after contracting is asymmetric and the agent has a certain 
amount of discretion making opportunistic behavior possible.126  
At the core of the principal–agent relationship in executive 
compensation is the short-term interest of the manager/agent to 
generate a high income that conflicts with the long-term 
ownership interest of the shareholders/principals. The relational 
elements in executive compensation contracts may further 
increase the principal–agent problem. The combination of 
knowledge exchange and relational collaboration in executive 
compensation contracts makes opportunistic behavior of 
executives likely.127 Contracting parties are, however, limited in 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 137–39 (explaining the benefits of 
experimentation for the evolution of contingent capital rules).  
 123. WILLIAMSON, supra note 119, at 32; Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Coase, 
Knight, and the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory of the Firm: A Reflection on 
Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as Entrepreneur Surrogate, 35 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1247, 1247 n.2 (2012); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative 
Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 269, 294 (1991) (expanding the analysis to governance 
mechanisms in relation to transaction costs). 
 124. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 119, at 30 (defining opportunism as “self-
interest seeking with guile”); see also FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 115. 
 125. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 24–25 
(1995). 
 126. See generally FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 115. 
 127. Short-termism to maximize personal income through stock options, the 
Fuld Problem (see infra Part VI.B), and income inequality between senior 
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their ability to anticipate opportunistic behavior of agents. 
Therefore, control rights to limit opportunistic behavior become 
increasingly important. Because of incomplete information, 
information asymmetries in the principal–agent relationship, 
bounded rationality of contracting parties, the parties’ limited 
cognition and foresight, and transaction costs, control rights in 
executive compensation contracts cannot account sufficiently for 
ex post opportunism of agents. Adding contingent convertible 
bonds with an early trigger to executive compensation packages 
can create a corporate governance mechanism that helps address 
these shortcomings.128  
Non-contractual behavior in the form of non-contractual 
norms, reciprocity, trust, friendship, reputation, altruism, 
interdependence, and moral obligations may be unenforceable 
through contractual agreements, but it can shape economic 
action.129 Non-contractual behaviors can harmonize conflicts and 
                                                                                                     
executives and the rest of the workforce are only a few examples of opportunistic 
behavior of agents in the context of executive compensation.  
 128. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the design of early triggers in executive 
compensation). 
 129. See JEFFERY PFEFFER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH PEOPLE 95 
(1994) (stating that executives are incentivized by social approval); Siegwart 
Lindenberg, The Cognitive Side Governance, 20 RES. SOC. ORGS. 47, 47 (2003); 
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 63–64 (1963) (stating that business behavior is 
guided in part by its effect on reputation); Ian R. MacNeil, The Many Futures of 
Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 731–33 (1974) (describing how contracts are 
typically coupled with non-contractual, non-economic motivations); Richard H. 
McAdams, Cultural Contingency and Economic Function: Bridge-Building from 
the Law & Economics Side, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 221, 222–23 (2004) (explaining 
that market practices are perpetuated both through contingent and non-
contingent practicalities); Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law 
Norms and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 636 (2001) (stating that 
norms are informally enforced by third-party sanctions such as ostracism); 
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 339 (1997) (describing how norms shape individual behavior 
that is not directly addressed by law). For a number of studies related to non-
contractual behaviors, see D. Eleanor Westney, Organisational Evolution of the 
Multinational Enterprise: An Organisational Sociology Perspective, 29 MGMT. 
INT’L REV. 56 (1999); Laszlo Bruszt & David Stark, Who Counts?: Supranational 
Norms and Societal Needs, 17 E. EUR. POLITICS & SOCIETIES 74 (2003); Walter 
Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 295 (1990) (noting that non-contractual behaviors such 
as altruism, reputation, and friendship can replace ineffectual legal contracts). 
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help sustain relationships.130 Therefore, non-contractual behavior 
should be considered in the attempt to optimize manager 
incentives for corporate governance improvements. 
V. Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation 
The academic literature on executive compensation is largely 
silent on the use of contingent convertible bonds in executive 
compensation. Similarly, the literature on contingent capital has 
mostly ignored the possible application of contingent convertible 
bonds in executive compensation.131 The governance-improving 
features of contingent convertible bonds132 can be applied to 
executive compensation. Contingent convertible bonds in 
executive compensation can help address the core executive 
compensation issues that emerged after the global Financial 
Crisis.133 More specifically, contingent convertible bonds in 
executive compensation packages can improve suboptimal 
incentives for risk-taking by executives, the alignment of 
executives’ interests with those of different constituents, 
sustainability, and income inequality. This Article proposes the 
use of contingent convertible bonds with early triggers in 
executive compensation packages. 
                                                                                                     
 130. Powell, supra note 129, at 303. 
 131. Barclays’s issuance of contingent convertible bonds to its executives 
precipitated some recognition of CCBs’ possible benefits. Hilscher and Raviv, for 
instance, recognize that the effects of contingent convertible bonds in executive 
compensation depend on the terms of the CCB. See Jens Hilscher & Alon Raviv, 
Bank Stability and Market Discipline: The Effect of Contingent Capital on Risk 
Taking and Default Probability 24 (Int’l Bus. Sch., Brandeis Univ., Working 
Paper, 2011), available at http://www.brandeis.edu/global/pdfs/news/Hilscher 
RavivPaper (showing that compensation with contingent convertible bonds can 
minimize risk-taking by managers). 
 132. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 295–96. 
 133. See Hill, supra note 22, at 24–31 (summarizing the core themes in 
recent proposals concerning executive compensation, including income 
inequality, incentive optimization, interest alignment, and sustainability).  
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A. Precedent Barclays 
The proposal in this Article to use contingent capital bonds 
with early triggers in executive compensation is not a mere 
theoretical construct. European SIFIs have started to add 
contingent convertible bonds to executive compensation packages. 
The English bank Barclays has issued contingent capital 
securities to its executives as deferred incentive awards.134 The 
contingent convertible bonds issued under Barclays’s Contingent 
Capital Plan (CCP), however, would not be written down or 
converted into equity like other CCBs. Under Barclays’s CCP, its 
“synthetic CoCos” simply lapse when the capital ratio falls below 
7%.135 More specifically, if Barclays’s Group Core Tier 1 capital 
ratio falls below the threshold, the executives will receive no 
coupon payment and the Contingent Capital Award (CCA) will 
                                                                                                     
 134. See Rob Cox, At Barclays, a Pay System That May Please, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 6, 2010, at B2 (“CoCos would not merely constitute a compensation fig leaf. 
Throwing the securities into bankers’ stockings better aligns their interests with 
those of regulators hoping to avoid a repeat of the taxpayer bailouts of the last 
financial crisis.”); BARCLAYS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 167 (“[D]eferred 
incentive awards for 2010 are made under the Share Value Plan (SVP) in the 
form of Barclays shares and under the Contingent Capital Plan (CCP) in the 
form of contingent capital awards.”). 
 135. E-mail from Mark Lane, Dir. of Corporate Commc’ns, Barclays Capital, 
to Wulf Kaal, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law (Dec. 14, 
2011, 3:52 PM CST) (on file with author and with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Jill Treanor, City Resists Barclays Chiefs’ ‘CoCo’ Bonuses: 
Bank Plans New Bonds to Boost Top Executives’ Pay, GUARDIAN Mar. 19, 2011, 
at 50 (“The cocos Barclays intends to use to pay its staff do not convert into 
equity, however, but merely fall away once the bank’s capital ratio falls below 
7%.”); Tommy Wilkes & Sinead Cruise, Barclays Heads for Investor Clash over 
Pay, REUTERS Apr. 26, 2011, http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancial 
ServicesAndRealEstateNews/idINLDE73K0DP20110426?irpc=984 (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jill Treanor, 
Barclays Faces Shareholder Anger over Bob Diamond’s Pay, GUARDIAN Apr. 20, 
2011, at 28 (“Cocos are a new type of financial instrument that can convert into 
equity during times of severe stress and have been issued by a handful of banks 
to raise fresh capital from investors.”) “Barclays, though, intends to issue the 
cocos only to its staff. The Barclays cocos will not convert into equity but merely 
fall away once the bank’s capital ratio falls below 7%—which is why they are 
being called synthetic cocos.” Id.; see also Editorial, Bankers and Their Bonuses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at WK.7 (“Cocos are long-term bonds that convert into 
equity if the bank hits a crisis. The idea is that paying bankers in bonds 
encourages them to keep the business solvent. This is even more so if a crisis 
triggers their conversion into shares that would become worthless in 
bankruptcy.”); BARCLAYS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 182. 
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remain unvested.136 However, the unvested portion of the CCA 
can be released and paid out to the executives if after six months 
the Group Core Tier 1 capital ratio has recovered.137 In order to 
take into account the possible effect of any actions taken to 
address the shortfall in the capital ratio on shareholders, the 
release may be adjusted. No coupon will be awarded if there was 
a downward adjustment.138 Should the Group Core Tier 1 capital 
ratio not recover to above 7% five years after the suspension of 
the CCA, the CCA will lapse.139  
Barclays’s contingent capital award to executives without a 
triggering event into equity and a mere lapse is beneficial 
because it underscores the possible use of contingent convertible 
bonds in executive compensation. Given European proposals on 
the use of contingent convertible bonds to make SIFIs safer and 
avoid bailouts,140 Barclays’s contingent convertible bond issuance 
to executives may also signal its willingness to consider the 
                                                                                                     
 136. BARCLAYS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 182.  
 137. Id.; see also Barclays, Barclays PLC Notice of Annual General Meeting 
2011, at 12 (Mar. 10, 2011), http://reports.barclays.com/ar10/files/pdfs/barcar 
10_notice.pdf. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Council Directives 
77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2001/35/EC and Regulation 
(EU) No. 1093/2010, COM (2012) 280/3, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/bank/docs/crisis-management/2012_eu_framework/COM_2012_280_en. 
pdf; Alex Barker & Brooke Masters, Brussels Looks to Bank Investors Not 
Taxpayers, FT.COM, June 6, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f94b6432-afeb-
11e1-ad0b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1xDA7jik4 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“The 
Reform blueprint gives national Regulators summary power to write down 
unsecured creditors in failing banks and establish a network of national funds 
to cover resolution costs . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Gareth Murphy, Mark Walsh & Matthew Willison, Precautionary 
Contingent Capital 6 (Bank of Eng. Fin. Stability Paper No. 16, 2012), http:// 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/fs_paper16.pdf (“[R]eplacing 
debt with contingent capital could encourage risk-shifting behaviour.”); George 
M. von Furstenberg, Contingent Capital to Strengthen the Private Safety Net for 
Financial Institutions: Cocos to the Rescue? 10 (Deutsche Bundesbank 
Discussion Paper No. 01/2011, 2011), http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/ 
44598/1/647226642.pdf (“This is the same year in which LBG later managed to 
launch a greatly oversubscribed cocos issue of ‘Enhanced Capital Notes’ (ECNs), 
for almost £9 billion (worth $15 billion).”). 
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possible uses of contingent convertible bonds to prepare the entity 
for future crises and systemic shocks. As the first mover in this 
context, it is also understandable that Barclays has decided to 
avoid the possible governance shakeup that could be associated 
with a contingent convertible bond issuance that provides a 
conversion feature. 
Barclays’s issuance is commendable. Its CCA, as a deferred 
compensation award, is inside debt. Unlike inside debt in the 
form of traditional bonds, however, it does not create a fixed 
claim for managers with a stake in the firm’s liquidation value 
because it falls away when converted.141 Barclays’s CCA, 
therefore, also does not lower agency cost. Without a stake in the 
liquidation value of the SIFI, executives may also not limit their 
risk-taking. Barclays’s executives’ interests are aligned with their 
debt-holders’ because executives are now also debt-holders, albeit 
in a separate class with substantially higher coupon payments. 
However, because the CCA falls away upon conversion, the 
executives’ interests are still predominantly aligned with 
shareholders’ through equity-based compensation, not through 
contingent convertible bond holdings.142  
Barclays’s issuance of contingent convertible bonds without a 
conversion feature to its executives shows limited governance 
improvements. Without a conversion to equity, Barclays provides 
only limited incentives for its executives to lower risk-taking. In 
its current form, the CCA seems to be a mere compensation 
supplement for executives. 
                                                                                                     
 141. Contrast this outcome with the proposal in this Article to use 
contingent convertible bonds with early triggers in executive compensation. See 
infra Part V.B.2 (showing that contingent convertible bonds with early triggers 
can lower agency costs more than traditional inside debt, provide greater 
incentives to lower risk-taking, align executives’ interests with the interests of 
both debt-holders and shareholders, and lower income inequality).  
 142. See infra Part V.B.2 (explaining how contingent convertible bonds in 
executive compensation align the interests of executives with debt-holders’ 
interests before conversion while increasing incentives for sustainability and 
lowering risk-taking and income inequality). Conversely, upon conversion into 
equity, CCBs align executives’ interests with the interests of equity-holders 
when it is most needed and beneficial for the SIFI, that is, early before the 
entity becomes insolvent. Id. 
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B. Design of Contingent Convertible Bonds in Executive 
Compensation 
Contingent convertible bonds issued to investors can have 
corporate governance implications as a result of the conversion 
feature and the threat of equity dilution following a conversion.143 
Issuing contingent convertible bonds to executives as part of their 
compensation can have different governance implications. 
Perhaps most important for this Article is contingent capital’s 
ability to generate powerful incentives for SIFI managers and 
thereby lower their risk-taking.144 This applies to contingent 
convertible bond issuances to investors145 but also, and more 
importantly, to the issuance of contingent capital to executives as 
part of their compensation. 
Designing contingent convertible bonds in executive 
compensation to be similar to contingent convertible bonds issued 
to investors could result in suboptimal outcomes. Unlike 
contingent convertible bonds issued to investors, contingent 
convertible bonds may be issued to executives in volumes that 
may not suffice to dilute investors’ equity holdings. The lower 
volume of contingent convertible bonds issued to executives may 
not provide a sufficiently strong equity infusion during a crisis. 
Without a design adjustment, contingent convertible bonds held 
by executives may not play a significant role in preparing SIFIs 
for future financial crises. Contingent convertible bonds in 
executive compensation should not be treated like other 
contingent capital securities. The design adjustment proposed in 
this Article helps to optimize the effectiveness of contingent 
convertible bonds in executive compensation and can improve 
corporate governance. 
                                                                                                     
 143. See Kaal, supra note 14.  
 144. Id.; Coffee, supra note 9, at 806; see also Dudley, supra note 90 (“If the 
bank encounters difficulties triggering conversion, shareholders would be 
automatically and immediately diluted. This would create strong incentives for 
bank managements to manage not only for good outcomes on the upside of the 
boom, but also against bad outcomes on the downside.”). 
 145. See Kaal, supra note 14. 
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1. Automatic Institution-Specific “Early” Trigger 
The literature on contingent capital trigger designs focuses 
on the efficient calibration of triggering events.146 The efficient 
calibration of triggering events is central to the design of 
contingent capital because the trigger affects if and when the 
conversion takes place. The timing of conversion is crucial for 
possible corporate governance improvements.  
The early trigger for contingent convertible bonds held by 
executives serves a different purpose than the trigger for 
contingent convertible bonds held by investors. The early trigger 
converts only the portion of executives’ debt to equity, before 
investors’ contingent convertible bonds are converted, when the 
entity is still sound on a micro-prudential basis. The purpose of 
an “early” or “strong” trigger design for CCBs held by executives 
is to establish an early warning system147 that is independent of 
                                                                                                     
 146. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9, at 806 (stating that contingent capital 
can help prevent the risk of the first step in a financial crisis); McDonald, supra 
note 95, at 2 (arguing for a conversion triggered by market prices); Pennacchi et 
al., supra note 13, at 7 (stating that CoCos can be effective if they are designed 
to convert prior to severe financial stress); Squam Lake Working Grp., supra 
note 91, at 4 (arguing for a long-term debt instrument that would convert to 
equity before a crisis); Suresh Sundaresan & Zhenyu Wang, On the Design of 
Contingent Capital with Market Trigger 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep. 
No. 448, Nov. 2011), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr448.pdf 
(explaining that a market trigger for conversion can provide stability to banks 
and markets); see also Duffie, supra note 96, at 5 (arguing that the trigger needs 
to be set so as to eliminate debt claims before a liquidity crisis); Flannery, 
Stabilizing, supra note 89; Flannery, No Pain, supra note 89, at 1 (introducing 
“reverse convertible debentures” that would convert if the issuing firm’s capital 
level fell below a prespecified level); Paul Glasserman & Behzad Nouri, 
Contingent Capital with a Capital-Ratio Trigger 2–3 (Working Paper, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669686 (examining conversion based on a 
capital-ratio trigger); Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al., Contingent Capital: Economic 
Rationale and Design Features 18 (IMF Staff Discussion Note No. SDN/11/01, 
2011), http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1101.pdf (arguing that 
contingent capital instruments should be considered part of a crisis prevention 
and management framework); GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that 
contingent capital is designed to operate before resolution mechanisms become 
involved); SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FINANCE ET AL., SWEDISH ANSWERS TO THE DG 
INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES WORKING DOCUMENT “TECHNICAL DETAILS OF A 
POSSIBLE EU FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION” 43 
(2011) [hereinafter SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FINANCE], http://www.riksbank.se/ 
Upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/Remisser/2011/Consultation_03031
1.pdf (arguing that bail-in tools may be used to minimize systemic risk). 
 147. The early warning nature of the early trigger design and the fact that 
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the capitalization needs of the entity148 and to provide corporate 
governance improvements. To ensure that the early warning 
objective of the early trigger is accomplished, it is important to 
distinguish between the two general categories of triggers 
discussed in the literature: (i) regulatory triggers and 
(ii) transactional and automatic triggers.149 
Regulatory triggers give regulators the authority to decide 
when to convert the contingent convertible bonds. The regulatory 
trigger may depend on a regulator’s determination that the 
respective bank is not viable without a public sector injection of 
capital or a write-off.150 It can also be based on the evaluation of a 
bank during a stress test conducted by regulators.151 Regulatory 
triggers may lead to market uncertainty and ad hoc decisions by 
regulators and result in adverse market responses. Because 
regulatory triggers generate the highest level of uncertainty,152 
they may not be the best option for the design of contingent 
convertible bonds in executive compensation. Regulatory 
discretion in triggering the conversion could create unfavorable 
market movements against the entity. While a regulator may 
decide to trigger executives’ CCBs as an early warning sign in a 
pending crisis, the cost of supervision could be prohibitive and 
regulatory discretion could alienate managers. Similarly, even 
though a regulatory trigger could help avoid abuse by 
                                                                                                     
only the executives’ portion of CCBs gets converted to equity could make it 
easier for the SIFI to negotiate bridge loans because the entity is still sound on a 
micro-prudential basis. If investors’ CCBs get triggered, some lenders may be 
unwilling to provide bridge loans. In effect, the early trigger could help avoid 
lenders turning away from the company when a large portion of its debt is 
converted into equity. 
 148. The benefit of providing additional capital when needed derives 
predominantly from the conversion of contingent convertible bonds issued to 
investors, not the portion of contingent convertible bonds issued to executives.  
 149. See Christoph K. Henkel & Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in 
European Union Bank Restructuring, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 191, 256–57 
(2012) (comparing dual triggers and sequential triggers). 
 150. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 12, at 8 (describing the attributes of a 
conversion trigger based on regulatory discretion). 
 151. Id.  
 152. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 149, at 255 (“[A regulatory systemic 
trigger] can be a trigger that converts CCS into equity upon, for instance, a 
regulator’s decision that additional capital is needed.”). 
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executives,153 regulatory triggers may insufficiently incentivize 
executives to lower risk because the executives would not have to 
self-monitor and adjust their risk-taking preferences to avoid the 
trigger.  
Transactional triggers, which are also called institution-
specific triggers, are privately negotiated terms for triggering 
events in bond contracts. They have the advantage of being 
flexible and tailored to the parties’ subjective needs.154 Automatic 
triggers are mostly privately negotiated terms in bond contracts 
that convert debt into equity when a certain capital ratio, stock 
price, CDS spread, index value, or other trigger is reached.155 
Because institution-specific automatic triggers are flexible and 
independent from regulatory discretion, they constitute a good 
option for early trigger designs. However, market-based 
measures may be susceptible to market manipulation and 
banking runs.156 Accounting-based measures in institution-
specific automatic triggers are arguably too infrequently updated 
to respond adequately in a financial crisis.  
Early triggers for contingent convertible bonds in executive 
compensation could yield particular benefits if they convert to 
equity before the contingent convertible bonds that were issued to 
investors.157 Early triggers could be based on various 
combinations of design features158 including perhaps already-
                                                                                                     
 153. See infra Part V.C (discussing design features to avoid abuse of CCBs). 
 154. Id.; see also SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FINANCE, supra note 146 (favoring a 
contractual trigger and arguing that a contractual trigger should come before a 
statutory trigger). 
 155. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 831 (listing potential conversion triggers); 
Flannery, Stabilizing, supra note 89, at 11–12 (same); Flannery, No Pain, supra 
note 89, at 15 (“Frequent trigger evaluations eliminate moral hazard incentives 
and expose the RCD to surprisingly low default risk.”); Glasserman & Nouri, 
supra note 146, at 2 (examining contingent capital with a capital-ratio trigger); 
McDonald, supra note 95, at 2 (proposing contingent capital that “converts to 
equity when the bank’s own stock price falls sufficiently, and then only if a 
broad financial stock index is also below a trigger value”). 
 156. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 841 (addressing concerns of market 
manipulation); Flannery, Stabilizing, supra note 89, at 18–20 (same); Flannery, 
No Pain, supra note 89, at 20 (acknowledging the possibility of manipulation); 
McDonald, supra note 95 , at 3 (same); Glasserman & Nouri, supra note 145, at 
3 (“[M]arket values could potentially be manipulated to trigger conversion.”). 
 157. See infra Part V.B.2.  
 158. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 251–54 (suggesting a sequential 
trigger design with a first trigger that converts CCBs into equity when the SIFI 
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existing designs of previously issued contingent convertible bonds 
to investors. An entity that has issued contingent convertible 
bonds to investors could simply lower the executives’ trigger 
threshold in contrast with that of the CCBs that were issued to 
investors.159 In the case of automatic institution-specific triggers, 
lowering the trigger could be accomplished by adjusting the 
capital ratio, stock price, CDS spread, index value, or other 
triggering event for the executives’ CCBs to cause the conversion 
at an earlier point during the financial weakening of the 
respective entity.160  
In the case of contingent convertible bonds with a capital-
ratio trigger,161 an “early” trigger for executives’ contingent 
convertible bonds could mean a 10% capital ratio whereas the 
“late” trigger for the contingent convertible bonds of investors 
could be around 8%.162 Regulatory capital requirements and 
industry standards for SIFIs or other banks that are categorized 
                                                                                                     
is still sound but encounters early signs of financial weakening, and a second 
trigger that increases the voting rights of CCBs holders after conversion if the 
SIFI does not recover). If contingent convertible bonds are issued to executives 
as part of a contingent convertible bond issuance with a sequential trigger 
design, the design should be adjusted to avoid potential abuse by executives. 
Executives may use the early trigger to obtain cheap stock in a crisis. 
Executives’ portion of the contingent convertible bond issuance should include a 
mandatory holding period of at least five years after conversion. Because 
executives’ interests could be adverse to those of CCBs investors, executives’ 
portion of the CCBs issuance should not include a voting rights increase. 
 159. Problems with trigger mechanisms have been discussed at length in the 
literature. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9, at 821, 827–29 (arguing that 
accounting-based measures may be too infrequently updated to respond 
effectively in a financial crisis, while regulatory triggers can lead to ad hoc 
decisions by regulators that result in market uncertainty and adverse market 
responses); McDonald, supra note 95, at 9–12, 22 (describing how market-based 
measures may be susceptible to market manipulation and banking runs). 
 160. Although it may be difficult to calibrate the trigger to provide for a 
specific time period before the conversion of investors’ CCBs, the early trigger 
should give sufficient warning of the weakening financial condition of the entity.  
 161. The capital ratio of an entity is the percentage of the entity’s capital to 
its risk-weighted assets. See Glasserman & Nouri, supra note 146, at 1–4 
(discussing contingent capital with a capital-ratio trigger and partial and 
ongoing conversion). 
 162. This is just a numerical example that does not take other factors into 
account. The purpose of this Article is not to suggest specific design features for 
“early” triggers. Rather, the purpose here is to show that the nature of 
ownership can have an impact on trigger designs and their potential to improve 
corporate governance. 
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as “well-capitalized” may change over time.163 To be effective, 
early triggers should be well above the threshold for capital 
requirements under Basel III.164 But early triggers in the form of 
capital ratios should be independent of regulatory demands 
pertaining to capitalization levels. 
2. The Benefits of “Early” Triggers 
Automatic institution-specific early triggers for contingent 
convertible bonds issued to executives may increase the overall 
effectiveness of these bonds and improve executive compensation 
policies.165 The benefits of early triggers may partially depend on 
whether the entity issues contingent convertible debt only to 
executives or to executives and investors.166 The early trigger for 
the portion of contingent convertible bonds held by executives can 
be an early warning system and buffer for contingent convertible 
bond investors and shareholders.167 Early triggers in contingent 
convertible bonds issued to executives provide several 
advantages: they lower risk-taking by executives and increase 
shareholder monitoring. They also offer a better signal for default 
                                                                                                     
 163. The recognition of contingent capital as Tier I Capital and the capital 
adequacy standards under Basel III may also influence the adequacy of an early 
trigger for contingent convertible bonds held by executives. See Kaal & Henkel, 
supra note 14, at 240 (examining the recognition of contingent capital as Tier I 
Capital).  
 164. Under Basel III, banks will have to hold better quality capital. Banks 
will have to hold minimum capital representing 8% of risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) as well as an additional capital buffer of 2.5% of RWA. 7% of RWA must 
be comprised of Tier 1 common equity. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 1, 64 (2010), http://www.bis. 
org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 
 165. See supra Part V. 
 166. Issuing contingent convertible bonds with the same design features to 
both investors and executives creates a risk of management opportunism if 
managers are heavily involved in the drafting process. Management 
opportunism can lead to socially suboptimal designs. See infra Part V.C 
(elaborating on design features to prevent abuse).  
 167. Investors would be able to anticipate a possible conversion of their 
CCBs if the early trigger resulted in a conversion of executives’ CCBs. The 
warning and signaling function of the early trigger would benefit CCBs 
investors and shareholders of the entity, which may be diluted if the investors’ 
CCBs are converted to equity.  
1860 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821 (2012) 
risk and align executives’ interests with a more diverse group of 
constituents.168  
Studies have shown that executives who hold more debt 
relative to their equity holdings take fewer risks when managing 
an entity.169 Increasing the debt portion of executive 
                                                                                                     
 168. These benefits could help make contingent convertible bonds generally 
more marketable. In the United States, where the tax treatment of these hybrid 
securities is still unclear, many investors still perceive contingent convertible 
bonds as a hybrid instrument with few attractive features despite a substantial 
coupon rate. See Satyajit Das, Investors Must Hope ‘Cocos’ Never Show Their 
Dark Side, FIN. TIMES, May 1, 2012, at 22 (“For investors, hybrids are a deeply 
subordinated investment with uncertain income and significant capital risk.”); 
cf. Liam Vaughan, Investors May Shun Banks’ Contingent Convertibles as 
Regulator Adds Limits, BLOOMBERG Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2011-12-13/investors-may-shun-coco-bonds-approved-by-european-reg 
ulators.html (discussing negative investor reactions to contingent convertible 
bonds issued by European banks). The early trigger design of CCBs issued to 
executives could help signal the entity’s intent to address default risk and 
systemic risk, to lower risk incentives, to align executives’ interests with 
creditor interests, and to increase monitoring and other corporate governance 
improvements. This could generate increased investor interest and help create a 
market for contingent convertible bonds in the United States. 
 169. Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 77–78 (explaining how debt 
compensation aligns managers’ incentives with the interests of the firm’s 
creditors and emphasizing the importance of a balanced mix of equity and debt 
in compensation); Gerakos, supra note 8, at 11–12 (finding that pension benefits 
may reduce risk-taking); Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 1 (“Theory predicts and 
empirical evidence supports the claim that as the proportion of CEO wealth held 
in the form of debt increases relative to CEO equity holdings, risk taking 
declines . . . .”); Wei & Yermack, supra note 8, at 3–5 (discussing the effect of 
debt compensation on volatility). Other studies reject the idea that corporate 
governance and executive compensation are correlated. See Core, Guay & 
Larcker, supra note 19, at 28 (“[A] number of scholars and practitioners either 
implicitly or explicitly take the view that contracting arrangements are largely 
inefficient and do not reduce agency costs.”); Mary Ellen Carter & Luann J. 
Lynch, An Examination of Executive Stock Option Repricing, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 
207, 222 (2001) (finding no relationship between institutional ownership and the 
repricing decision); Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing 
the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive 
Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 268–69 (2004) (describing the Managerial 
Power Hypothesis and the correlation between executive compensation and 
performance); Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Stakeholder Pressure and the Structure 
of Executive Compensation 16–17, 38 (Working Paper, 1997), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=41780 (examining the effect 
of shareholder proposals on performance); see also Ronald C. Anderson & John 
M. Bizjak, An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO and the 
Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 
1323, 1324–26 (2003) (discussing the role of compensation committees in 
determining executive pay); Kam-Ming Wan, Independent Directors, Executive 
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compensation packages with contingent convertible bonds can 
help lower managers’ risk incentives.170 This effect could be even 
more pronounced depending on the proportion of CCBs included 
in the total compensation of executives. However, path 
dependencies in the executive compensation culture in the United 
States will likely make it difficult for executive compensation 
policies to move entirely to contingent convertible bonds or other 
debt instruments. It is more likely that compensation committees 
will continue to combine debt instruments with equity-based 
compensation.  
The conversion of contingent convertible bonds from debt to 
equity, if triggered, would mean that executives hold a highly 
discounted equity interest in the entity.171 This may in turn 
depress the stock price of the respective entity.172 A negative 
effect on the stock price of the entity may lower the value of the 
                                                                                                     
Pay, and Firm Performance 23 (Working Paper, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=392595 (“[There is] no 
systematic evidence that board composition affects change in CEO 
compensation.”). 
 170. Calcagno & Renneboog, supra note 82, at 1796 (“[I]ncrease in the 
leverage of Anglo-American corporations has also stimulated the interest in the 
role of debt as a direct incentive device . . . including risky debt in the capital 
structure changes the ‘incentive to give incentives . . . .’”); Edmans & Liu, supra 
note 82, at 77–78 (justifying the use of debt as efficient compensation and 
arguing that a debt bias can improve effort as well as deter risk-shifting); 
Krawcheck, supra note 82, at 108–09 (suggesting that CEOs with large inside 
debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior); Listokin, supra 
note 82 (proposing debt compensation as an incentive for managers during 
bankruptcy); Ortiz-Molina, supra note 82, at 70 (“[T]he agency costs of debt can 
also be reduced by using convertible debt . . . .”); Edmans, supra note 82, at R1 
(suggesting debt compensation as a means to reduce risk); Bolton, Mehran & 
Shapiro, supra note 19, at 2 (“[M]arket participants do indeed believe that 
linking executive compensation to default risk will reduce the riskiness of the 
firm.”); Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 5 (“[Our] empirical evidence provides a 
rationale for the use of inside debt compensation in structuring executive 
compensation in the banking context.”). 
 171. See infra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for 
abuse).  
 172. Depending on financial institutions’ implementation of contingent 
convertible bonds and the evolution of the market in CCBs, the potential effect 
of CCBs conversion on stock prices may be evaluated in future research. See 
Sundaresan & Wang, supra note 146, at 25 (suggesting that under their design 
of contingent capital, where the state-contingent conversion ratio prevents value 
transfer, the prices would be kept “‘smooth’ at conversion”). 
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equity portion of executives’ compensation packages.173 The 
conversion thus not only affects the debt portion of executives’ 
compensation but also the equity portion after the contingent 
convertible bonds portion is converted and when equity is 
increasingly important to maintain the overall value of executive 
compensation.174 The combined effect could be a strong incentive 
for executives to take lower risks in order to avoid the triggering 
event.175 The implicit reduction in agency costs176 may be difficult 
to measure without actual implementation. The early conversion 
feature does not only create incentives for managers to lower 
their risk-taking; indeed, the implicit threat of financial loss for 
all contingent convertible bond investors, in combination with the 
threat of dilution to existing shareholders, could create overall 
increased pressure on managers to avoid the conversion of any 
portion of CCB, including the conversion of investors’ CCBs. 
The issuance of contingent convertible bonds with early 
triggers to executives may motivate shareholders, CCBs 
                                                                                                     
 173. This effect would be multiplied if the design of early CCBs triggers also 
prohibited the exercise of stock options in anticipation of the early trigger and 
after the triggering event. It could be technically difficult to delineate what “in 
anticipation of the early trigger” means. Defining a suitable time period for the 
prohibition before the early trigger could be equally difficult. 
 174. There is a risk that opportunism may lead managers to increase the 
risk profile of the entity after conversion to regain the lost equity value in their 
portfolio. However, such action is not likely to occur because an increase in the 
risk profile would affect the ability of the entity to obtain other forms of 
financing such as bridge loans. The increase in the risk profile after conversion 
is also improbable because the early conversion would likely increase 
monitoring by CCBs investors and shareholders. Boards may decide to let 
managers go upon the occurrence of an early trigger.  
 175. Managing to avoid the triggering event alone may be possible by 
ignoring the other interests of various constituents. However, this Article does 
not attempt to provide a holistic approach to corporate governance reform in 
SIFIs. 
 176. For purposes of this Article, “agency cost” is defined as the cost for the 
corporation as principal to supervise its executives as agents and protect 
investors and other constituents against agents’ opportunism. Executive 
compensation agreements can be seen as attempts to reduce agency costs. See 
Jensen & Murphy, supra note 7, at 138, 139–40 (explaining that executive 
compensation agreements and compensation awards are mostly attempts by the 
principal to minimize agency costs, i.e., minimize their agents’ opportunism and 
tendency to be risk averse, to invest in suboptimal or idiosyncratic projects, to 
shirk, etc.); cf. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 65, at 1917–18 (discussing the 
manner in which some forms of compensation agreements increase agency costs 
by incentivizing risk-taking and explaining how this can be fixed). 
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investors, and other creditors to increase their monitoring. 
Because of an implicit expectation that the government will 
provide bailout funding due to the nature of the entity, ordinary 
SIFI creditors may have suboptimal incentives to monitor the 
performance of management.177 These incentives may change if a 
SIFI issues contingent capital securities with a conversion 
feature for investors and with an early conversion feature for its 
executives.178 Should the conversion of executives’ contingent 
convertible bonds occur, investors’ CCBs would likely be next in 
line for conversion.179 In effect, the conversion of the contingent 
convertible bonds issued to executives provides early notice to 
                                                                                                     
 177. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 266–67 (describing how, 
unlike many other corporations, SIFIs are subject to a high probability of 
default and high leverage); see also Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, 
Leverage, Bubbles and the Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
225, 277 (2011); David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: 
Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35, 38 
(2000) (explaining how deposit insurance helps make debt cheaper than equity); 
Julian Jeffrey Gordon & Colin Mayer, The Micro, Macro and International 
Design of Financial Regulation 7 (Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 
422, 2012) (“[G]overnment securities are far less secure than was previously 
thought and in the process of seeking to rescue financial institutions, 
governments may undermine the security of the assets that they have required 
their banks to hold.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation 
to Address the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 741–43 (2010) 
(describing the moral hazard created by government insurance); T.S. Chow & 
Jay Surti, Making Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It? 3 (IMF Working 
Paper No. 11/236, 2011), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/ 
Documents/events/ccbs_workshop2012/paper_SurtiChow.PDF; Arthur E. 
Wilmarth Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform that Could Solve the Too-
Big-To-Fail Problem and Align U.S. and U.K. Regulation of Financial 
Conglomerates 4 (GWU Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 2012-40, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2050544 
(describing the moral hazard created by government insurance). 
 178. Once a SIFI has issued contingent convertible bonds with conversion 
features, creditors are likely to be aware of the triggering events in the 
executives’ portion of CCBs because the triggers become public information. If a 
SIFI issues CCBs, its intent is likely to avoid future bailouts. Creditors would be 
aware of the SIFI’s intent and the measures taken to avoid a bailout and may be 
less likely to rely on future bailouts. 
 179. The proximity of conversion of executives’ CCBs and investors’ CCBs 
will depend on the trigger design. If the entity uses an institution-specific early 
automatic trigger based on a capital ratio for executives’ CCBs and a similar 
trigger with a less aggressive triggering threshold for investors’ CCBs, the 
proximity of conversion would depend on the difference in capital ratio in the 
respective trigger designs of executives’ CCBs and investors’ CCBs.  
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investors that their CCBs may also convert into equity unless 
they address the underlying issues. Accordingly, managers would 
likely be subjected to increased scrutiny by investors who fear the 
conversion of their contingent convertible bonds into near-
worthless equity. Shareholders who fear the loss of their entire 
investment should the entity go into bankruptcy may also put 
managers under increased pressure to lower their risk-taking.180 
The impending threat of dilution for existing shareholders due to 
the possible conversion of the contingent convertible bonds held 
by investors may motivate existing shareholders to get actively 
involved in the governance of the entity.181 Shareholder voting on 
management proposals to address perceived concerns could 
increase. The implicit threat of financial loss for all contingent 
convertible bonds investors in combination with the threat of 
dilution to existing shareholders could create overall increased 
pressure on managers to avoid the conversion of any portion of 
the CCBs. 
Early triggers for contingent convertible bonds in executive 
compensation packages may increase and optimize the signaling 
of default risk at a time when the risk of default is present but 
still somewhat remote. Various existing measures signal default 
risk.182 Early triggers in executive compensation, however, signal 
                                                                                                     
 180. A possible downside of early conversion as a warning signal could be 
added pressure on the stock price, which could have negative effects in a 
pending crisis. 
 181. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005) (arguing that increased shareholder 
democracy will improve corporate governance and enhance managerial 
accountability, thereby curbing abuses of authority and misconduct); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1804 (2006) (“With stock ownership divided among many 
owners, shareholders have little incentive to exert effort to monitor 
management and actively intervene in corporate decisionmaking.”); Bernard S. 
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 530–66 (1990) 
(providing an overview of various legal obstacles to shareholder action).  
 182. Existing signaling mechanisms for default risk, such as credit default 
swap pricing and Capital Asset management, Management, Earnings, and asset 
Liability management (CAMEL) ratings, do not seem to have provided sufficient 
protection for SIFIs during the past crisis. CAMEL ratings and credit default 
swap pricing did not suffice to signal default risk in the cases of Lehman 
Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch. See generally Aline Darbellay & 
Frank Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies and Regulatory Reform, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. 
McDonnell eds., 2012); Tao Sun, Identifying Vulnerabilities in Systemically-
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an entity’s default risk much sooner than previously proposed 
triggers for contingent convertible bonds issued to investors and 
other mechanisms. The benefits of this early default signal 
include more time for managers to (1) adjust to the current 
market conditions, (2) lower their risk-taking, and (3) deleverage 
in a comparatively liquid market environment. The improved 
signaling of default risk through the early conversion of 
executives’ CCBs may help address the systemic risks that SIFIs 
pose. Early triggers in CCBs, when used in executive 
compensation, can improve the core function of CCBs, that is, 
lowering systemic risk. 
                                                                                                     
Important Financial Institutions in a Macro-Financial Linkages Framework 
(IMF Working Paper No. 11/111, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1848543. Although CAMEL ratings may reach the 
public through bank financial statements and other disclosures made after a 
downgrade, CAMEL ratings are only released to top management. See Allen N. 
Berger & Sally M. Davies, The Information Content of Bank Examinations, 14 J. 
FIN. SERVS. RES. 117, 119 (1994) (“[B]ank examination data currently are 
confidential . . . .”); R. Alton Gilbert, Kevin L. Kliesen, Andrew P. Meyer & 
David C. Wheelock, Federal Reserve Lending to Troubled Banks During the 
Financial Crisis 9 (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-006A, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038578 
(“Examination ratings are not released publicly, but are made available both to 
the examined institution and to supervisory authorities . . . .”); John S. Jordan, 
Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, The Impact of Greater Bank Disclosure Amidst a 
Banking Crisis 4 (Fed. Res. Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 99-1, 1998), 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp1999/wp99_1.pdf (“Most countries disclose 
little, if any, of their supervisory assessment of banks.”); Donald P. Morgan, 
Judging the Risk of Banks: What Makes Banks Opaque? 1–7 (Fed. Res. Bank of 
N.Y., Working Paper No. 98-05, 1998), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research 
/staff_reports/research_papers/9805.pdf (discussing the characteristics of banks 
that make it difficult for outsiders to judge their level of risk). There is also 
some evidence that on-site bank exams can provide additional information 
beyond what is publicly available. See Robert DeYoung, Mark J. Flannery, 
William W. Lang & Sorin M. Sorescu, The Informational Advantage of 
Specialized Monitors: The Case of Bank Examiners 23 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., 
Working Paper No. 98-4, 1998), http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/ 
publications/working_papers/1998/wp98_4.pdf (finding that CAMEL ratings 
contain more information than is publicly available). CAMEL ratings also may 
require on-site examinations to verify the accuracy of reports and to gather 
further supervisory information. See Jose A. Lopez, Using CAMELS Ratings to 
Monitor Bank Conditions, FRBSF ECON. LETTER (Fed. Res. Bank of S.F.), June 
11, 1999, available at http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr99/el99-
19.html (describing on-site examinations); Bolton, Mehran & Shapiro, supra 
note 19, at 1 (suggesting a reduction in excessive risk-taking by tying CEO 
compensation to the financial firm’s credit default swap spread—a high CDS 
results in lower compensation and vice versa). 
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The hybrid nature of contingent convertible bonds and the 
early conversion from debt to equity aligns the interests of 
executives equally with creditors and shareholders.183 Before the 
unlikely but theoretically possible conversion into equity, 
contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation align the 
interests of executives with holders of traditional debt and debt in 
the form of contingent convertible bonds. Because executives 
would be holding securities with long-term maturities and coupon 
payments, executives would have incentives to manage the 
company with the interests of debt-holders in mind.184 How well 
these incentives work may depend on the proportion of debt in 
the compensation packages of executives. Managers’ level of risk-
taking and their strategic management of the entity could become 
more focused on long-term and sustainable development as a 
result of the interest alignment between managers and debt-
                                                                                                     
 183. Traditionally, because shareholders elected directors and senior 
executives played a major role in this process, executives’ interests were aligned 
with shareholder interests. See generally Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 
655–56 (showing the enormous influence CEOs can have in the election of 
directors and other governance issues). The emphasis on equity-based 
instruments in executive compensation has made a large proportion of 
executives’ compensation dependent on stock performance, which aligns 
executives’ interests with the interests of shareholders. See Core, Guay & 
Larcker, supra note 19 (synthesizing the broad literature on equity 
compensation and executive incentives, and highlighting topics that seem 
especially appropriate for future research); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. 
Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 
225, 226–27 (1990) (estimating the magnitude of the various mechanisms 
through which compensation policy can provide value-increasing incentives, 
including performance-based bonuses and salary revisions, stock options, and 
performance-based dismissal decisions); Meulbroek, supra note 19, at 5 
(“Finance theory has long made the case for the use of equity-linked 
compensation plans as an effective means to align managers’ incentives with 
those of shareholders. In the last decade, finance practice, particularly in the 
United States, has embraced this prescription . . . .”); cf. Guido A. Ferrarini & 
Maria C. Ungureanu, Economics, Politics, and the International Principles for 
Sound Compensation Practices: An Analysis of Executive Pay at European 
Banks, 64 VAND. L. REV. 431, 460 (2011) (explaining that the French banking 
model endured the crisis better than the traditionally liberal British model 
because of heavy regulation). Without a substantial portion of compensation in 
the form of debt instruments, managers may give into shareholder pressure to 
take higher risks for higher returns. 
 184. Managing the entity in the interest of debt-holders has implications for 
risk-taking, income inequality, and the sustainable development of the entity. 
See infra Part VI (discussing the impact of the proposed design on income 
inequality and sustainability). 
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holders and managers’ changed incentives.185 Because the early 
trigger for executives’ contingent convertible bonds also protects 
shareholders and their interest in the continuing existence of the 
entity,186 executives’ interests may be equally aligned with 
shareholders187 at a time when it is most needed.188 
If contingent convertible bonds replace a portion of equity-
based compensation, contingent convertible bonds could lower 
income inequality189 and increase sustainability. If financial 
institutions begin using CCBs in executive compensation 
packages, depending on the calibration of the packages, the 
                                                                                                     
 185. Given that the average tenure of executives in the United States is less 
than seven years, interest alignment between managers and debt-holders is 
somewhat limited. However, debt in executive compensation could help shift 
executives’ management style so that it increasingly includes a long-term 
perspective. Managing for the long-term, in turn, could translate into longer 
tenures for executives. For a discussion of the increasing turnover rate of CEOs 
in the United States, see, for example, Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. 
Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 58 (2012) 
(stating that a study of CEO tenure revealed that “[a]nnual turnover is 15.8% 
from 1992 to 2007, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than 7 years . . . . 
Since 2000, total CEO turnover increases to about 16.8%, implying an average 
CEO tenure of about 6 years.”); see also The Doofus Factor: How Can You Tell a 
Good Board of Directors from a Bad One? ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2011, at 69, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/ 21529101 (“During the past decade 
the average tenure of chief executives has fallen to 6.6 years from 8.1 years, 
according to a recent study by Booz & Co, a consultancy.”). 
 186. See infra Part VI (elaborating on improved incentives for lowering risk, 
improved signaling of default risk, and improved monitoring).  
 187. Regardless of compensation policies, the strong relationship between 
managers and shareholders will likely endure. It is unlikely that firms will 
compensate managers entirely with debt. See infra Part VI.A (discussing 
contingent capital as inside debt). 
 188. The early trigger design could help align the interests of the two most 
powerful constituents in a financial institution at a time when it is most needed. 
Because executives become equity holders at a time when their actions should 
be most aligned with equity holders’ interests, that is, early before a possible 
insolvency of the entity, the early trigger design enables a shift in executive 
compensation and a corresponding interest alignment when it is most needed. 
Although the interests of managers are likely to be more aligned with those of 
shareholders, executives who hold hybrid securities may be incentivized to 
manage for the long-term and sustainable development of the entity and avoid 
volatility.  
 189. See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation 
Reform, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 586, 588, 596–97 (2007–2008) (arguing that 
reforming executive compensation seems to be moderately important in 
reducing inequality in the United States).  
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replacement of equity-based compensation with contingent 
convertible bonds could lower the overall compensation of 
executives. Although contingent convertible bonds would likely 
pay a substantial coupon rate,190 the return for executives would 
likely be incomparable with the return attainable with stock 
options and other equity-based compensation. If stock options are 
replaced with CCBs, not only would the total compensation for 
executives be lowered; short-termism and executives’ focus on 
quarterly stock price performance would also be disincentivized. 
Executives are more likely to consider the sustainable 
development of the entity when stock price appreciation no longer 
directly benefits them personally. However, it is important to 
note that path dependencies in the executive compensation 
culture191 in the United States could make the lowering of overall 
compensation for executives and the addition of new design 
elements in executive compensation difficult. 
C. Design Features to Avoid Abuse 
If SIFI executives are compensated with contingent 
convertible bond instruments, opportunism could lead them to 
manipulate the triggering event to obtain stock upon contingent 
convertible bonds’ conversion at a depressed price before or 
during a crisis.192 For instance, the conversion into equity at a 
                                                                                                     
 190. See Kaal, supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the coupon 
rate of between 7% and 9.2% paid by previously issued CCBs).  
 191. See generally Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path 
Dependence and Complementarity in Corporate Governance, in CONVERGENCE 
AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 114 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. 
Roe eds., 2004); Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and 
Global Crossing: Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. 
L. J. 723, 764–65 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path 
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129–
34 (1999) (proposing the “path dependence theory” where a country’s corporate 
law structure depends on the history of corporate law in that country); Hill & 
McDonnell, supra note 1; Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: 
Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 147 (2001). But cf. S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path 
Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 205–06 (1995) 
(challenging path dependence theory).  
 192. See Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 140, at 7, 10 (“[T]he trigger 
metric could be undermined if it could be manipulated . . . .”). “With a trigger 
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value of $3 with a book value of $10 would create a substantial 
payoff. Opportunism may lead executives to disregard the impact 
of triggering the conversion on their reputation and career 
development prospects if the payoff is substantial.  
Without rules and regulatory guidance regarding the design 
and issuance of contingent convertible bonds, SIFI executives 
may only be curtailed by their fiduciary duties. Existing fiduciary 
duties could prove insufficient to limit opportunism and abuse if 
the payoff for executives is substantial.193 Contingent convertible 
bondholders, regular bondholders, and shareholders would 
benefit from broader fiduciary duties.194  
                                                                                                     
metric based on a bank’s equity price, there would be a risk that investors may 
short-sell a bank’s equity to drive the equity price down in the absence of any 
change in the underlying value of a bank’s assets and trigger a conversion event 
that results in a transfer of value from existing equity holders to precautionary 
contingent capital holders . . . .” Id. “[T]he risk of using market capitalisation to 
define the trigger event is that it could give investors an incentive to manipulate 
the equity price to trigger a conversion.” Id. 
 193. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The 
Emerging Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
CORPORATE LAW 133 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012); Johnson 
& Sides, supra note 26, at 1194 (“[I]n corporate law, where the duties are broad 
and usefully ill-defined—decision-makers must act with ‘loyalty’ and ‘care’ and 
in ‘good faith,’ but are accorded wide latitude in discharging their governance 
responsibilities in conformance with these standards.”); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1196 (2003) (stating that an impression of tolerance of bad 
habits is created by focusing solely on a board’s duty of inquiry without 
analyzing the underlying breach of managers’ duty); A. Gilchrist Sparks III & 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate 
Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 217 (1992) (explaining the general proposition that 
corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duties as those owed by directors); 
Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: 
Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 846, 848–49 (2011) (arguing that courts have a stronger doctrine they 
can employ when called on to monitor abuses in executive compensation—the 
fiduciary duties of officers); see also Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, 
Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 
1600, n.10 (2005) (“[C]ourts and commentators routinely describe the duties of 
directors and officers together, and in identical terms.”); Thomas J. Moloney, 
Paul R. St. Lawrence, III & Angela F. Hamarich, Fiduciary Duties, Broker-
Dealers and Sophisticated Clients: A Mis-Match That Could Only Be Made in 
Washington, 3 J. SEC. L. REG. & COMPLIANCE 336, 337–42 (2010) (providing an 
overview of the fiduciary-duty debate); Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the 
Public Interest, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1191, 1200–02 (2011) (analyzing fiduciary duties 
in the recent economic downturn).  
 194. See Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an 
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Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Crime and Drugs, Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 835 (2010) (statement 
of John C. Coffee Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law 
School) (arguing that legislation is needed “to protect investors and to maintain 
market transparency and economic efficiency” and to return to the traditional 
norm that brokers should seek “to serve their clients (and not seek to profit from 
their losses)”); Danny Busch & Deborah A. DeMott, Liability of Asset Managers 
(Introduction), in LIABILITY OF ASSET MANAGERS (Danny Busch & Deborah A. 
DeMott eds., 2012); TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011) (clarifying the 
theoretical underpinning for an expansive version of fiduciary duties and 
applying fiduciary theory to such contemporary problems as those in the 
securities industry and the professions, as well as to corporate issues such as 
executive compensation); Thomas Lee Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties 
and the Impact of the Dodd–Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 47, 47 (2011) 
(“[A]lthough the existing framework for broker-dealer regulation is robust, it 
could be fine-tuned by possibly adding an express fiduciary duty requirement as 
well as more specific rule-based prohibitions.”); Douglas C. Michael, The 
Corporate Officer’s Independent Duty as a Tonic for the Anemic Law of Executive 
Compensation, 17 J. CORP. L. 785, 786, 824 (1992) (arguing that officers should 
have a “duty not to accept unreasonable compensation” and that courts should 
use officers’ fiduciary duties to engage in a sweeping review of the 
reasonableness of compensation); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil 
the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty through Legal Liability, 42 
HOUS. L. REV. 393, 394 (2005) (“[L]egal liability represents an essential 
mechanism for ensuring directors’ fidelity to their fiduciary duties and for 
questioning reform efforts that do not include such liability.”). For advocates of a 
fiduciary duty to bondholders, see, for example, LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Margaret M. 
Blair, Stakeholders as Shareholders, Ownership and Control: Rethinking 
Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1150 
(1996); William W. Bratton Jr., Public Values and Corporate Fiduciary Law, 44 
RUTGERS L. REV. 675 (1992); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 305; David 
Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 
IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate 
Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263 (1992); Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The 
Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime that 
Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587 (1997). 
Contra Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an 
Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Crime and Drugs, Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 835 (2010) (statement 
of Larry E. Ribstein, Associate Dean for Research & Mildred Van Voorhis Jones 
Chair, University of Illinois College of Law); Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing 
Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899 (2011) (arguing for a more precise 
definition and more limited application of fiduciary duties because their 
usefulness depends on differentiation from other duties that apply in other 
settings). For cases that discuss officers’ fiduciary duties, see generally Hill & 
McDonnell, supra note 193, at 133. 
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In practice, the proportion of contingent convertible bond 
instruments in the total mix of executive compensation packages 
will likely be limited, which may counteract possible abuse. A 
mandatory holding period for all equity securities held by 
executives in the entity they manage195 after the conversion of 
their contingent convertible bonds into equity takes place would 
help limit possible abuse. A broader approach to curtail abuse 
could entail the cancellation of any stock options or other equity-
based pay arrangements in the compensation packages of 
executives upon the conversion of executives’ CCBs. Ultimately, 
manager/agent opportunism that results from the design of CCBS 
triggers and managers’ participation in the design may 
necessitate regulatory guidance in the form of general principles 
or best practice guidelines for the design of CCBs and their 
issuance to investors and executives. 
Although executives are unlikely to be directly involved in 
designing their own contingent convertible bond awards, 
executives often have a strong involvement and influence in the 
executive compensation process.196 Assuming that executives act 
opportunistically197 within the bounds of their fiduciary duties, 
executives may not create socially optimal designs for contingent 
convertible bonds. Executives’ opportunism and involvement in 
drafting the trigger could result in suboptimal early triggers in 
contingent convertible bonds issued to executives. If the trigger 
design allows executives to influence the early trigger, the 
suboptimal early trigger could increase the potential for abuse 
because executives may use the trigger to obtain cheap stock 
during a crisis. If executives are involved in drafting the features 
of contingent convertible bonds issued to investors, their 
opportunism could result in contingent convertible bond designs 
that do not result in a significant threat of equity dilution upon 
conversion and other governance-improving design features.198 
Because regulators and others are unlikely to provide rules, 
                                                                                                     
 195. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1, at 2–3 (discussing equity-based 
compensation).  
 196. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1; Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2.  
 197. See supra Part IV (showing that the incomplete contract theory model 
acknowledges agent opportunism in the analysis of executive compensation 
policies).  
 198. Kaal, supra note 14. 
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guidelines, and best practice guidance for contingent convertible 
bond designs and issuances anytime soon, executives may 
continue to have a strong involvement in the design of contingent 
convertible bonds.199 Regulatory guidance on contingent capital 
designs and issuances may be needed to curtail the involvement 
of executives in the design of contingent convertible bonds and 
create socially optimal designs.200 Contingent convertible bonds 
with early triggers in executive compensation could help create 
socially optimal designs for contingent convertible bonds issued to 
investors.201 
VI. Implications for Academic Debates 
Instituting contingent convertible bonds with early triggers 
in executive compensation packages adds a new perspective to 
the academic debate in the context of inside debt, the creditor-
centered approach to executive compensation, and the design of 
triggering events.202 As a result of their early conversion into 
equity (or the threat thereof), contingent convertible bonds 
provide several advantages beyond the benefits of traditional 
inside debt instruments in executive compensation.203 Contingent 
convertible bonds also add benefits to the creditor-centered 
approach to executive compensation.204 In the context of the 
creditor-centered approach, adding contingent convertible bonds 
or replacing other debt instruments in executive compensation 
                                                                                                     
 199. Institution- and industry-specific knowledge may make executives 
indispensable in drafting contingent convertible bonds. Regulatory guidelines 
and best practice guidance for contingent convertible bond designs could help 
ensure that executives are sufficiently involved but do not create socially 
suboptimal designs.  
 200. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 139–41 (noting that private ordering and 
market mechanisms may not result in socially optimal designs for contingent 
convertible bonds). 
 201. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing the benefits of a design with early 
triggers).  
 202. See supra Part VI.A–C (discussing contingent capital as inside debt, 
improving the creditor-centered approach, and the impact of ownership 
characteristics on trigger design). 
 203. See infra Part VI.A (discussing contingent capital as inside debt). 
 204. See infra Part VI.B (discussing ways to improve the creditor-centered 
approach). 
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packages with contingent convertible bonds can optimize 
managers’ risk incentives, especially in comparison with 
traditional debt instruments in executive compensation 
packages.205 In the context of the debate on trigger designs, 
contingent convertible bonds with early triggers show that the 
ownership characteristics of the contingent convertible 
bondholders can have an impact on the efficient design of 
contingent capital triggers.206 
A. Contingent Capital as Inside Debt 
Empirical studies have demonstrated that risk-taking 
declines if executives hold more debt relative to their equity 
holdings.207  Inside debt may be defined as a corporation’s debt 
                                                                                                     
 205. See infra Part VI.B (discussing ways to improve the creditor-centered 
approach). 
 206. See infra Part VI.C (discussing the impact of ownership characteristics 
on trigger design). 
 207. See Calcagno & Renneboog, supra note 82, at 1808–09 (maintaining 
that the increase in the leverage of Anglo-American corporations has stimulated 
interest in the role of debt as a direct incentive device for managers to generate 
stronger corporate performance and showing that including risky debt in the 
capital structure changes a principal’s “incentive to give incentives”); see also 
Edmans & Liu, supra note 82 (arguing that a debt bias can improve executives’ 
efforts as well as deter risk-shifting); Tao-Hsien Dolly King & Min-Ming Wen, 
Shareholder and Bondholder Governance, and Managerial Risk-Taking, 35 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 512, 530 (2011) (showing that strong bondholder governance 
incentivizes low-risk investments); Ortiz-Molina, supra note 82, at 78–83, 90–91 
(examining how CEO compensation is related to firms’ capital structures and 
arguing that the hypothesis that debt reduces manager–shareholder conflicts 
can explain some—but not all—of the results); Sundaram & Yermack, supra 
note 8; Gerakos, supra note 8, at 23 (finding that pension benefits may reduce 
risk-taking); Tung & Wang, supra note 8 (showing that their empirical evidence 
provides a rationale for the use of inside debt compensation in structuring 
executive compensation in the banking context); Wei & Yermack, supra note 8. 
Other studies reject the idea that corporate governance and executive 
compensation are correlated. See Core et al., supra note 8, at 385–88; Dorff, 
supra note 169, at 5; Johnson et al., supra note 169, at 17, 38; Carter & Lynch, 
supra note 169, at 222 (finding no relationship between institutional ownership 
and the re-pricing decision); see also Anderson & Bizjak, supra note 169, at 
1344; Wan, supra note 169, at 23 ( “[There is] no systematic evidence that board 
composition affects change in CEO compensation.”). Some scholars argue that 
there is no role for inside debt in executive compensation because bonuses, 
salaries, and managerial reputation constitute adequate remedies to debt’s 
agency costs. See David Hirshleifer & Anjan V. Thakor, Managerial 
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held by firm insiders.208 Inside debt, which includes pensions and 
deferred compensation,209 is already a substantial part of 
executive compensation in the United States.210 Unlike equity-
based compensation, inside debt creates fixed claims for 
managers with a stake in the firm’s liquidation value, which 
reduces risk-taking incentives for executives and the associated 
agency costs.211 When managers have a stake in the liquidation 
value of the firm, they are more likely to increase their efforts in 
the vicinity of insolvency.212 Inside debt could provide adequate 
signaling of managers’ risk-taking.213  
Inside debt in the form of contingent convertible bonds has 
characteristics that could prove preferable to traditional inside 
debt.214 Managers’ inside debt stake in the firm’s liquidation 
                                                                                                     
Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 437 (1992); James A. 
Brander & Michael Poitevin, Managerial Compensation and the Agency Costs of 
Debt Finance, 13 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 55 (1992); Teresa A. John & 
Kose John, Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure, 48 J. FIN. 
949, 969–71 (1993). 
 208. Cassell et al., supra note 8, at 588 (“CEO inside debt holdings (pension 
benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded 
liabilities of the firm.”); Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 75 (defining inside 
debt as debt—or any security with payoffs very similar to debt—held by the 
manager, and contrasting it with outside debt, which is held by external 
investors); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30, at 352 (defining inside debt as 
“debt held by the manager”). 
 209. Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 76 (“U.S. CEOs hold substantial 
defined benefit pensions. These are unsecured, unfunded obligations which, in 
nearly all cases, have equal priority with other creditors in bankruptcy and thus 
constitute inside debt.”); Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8, at 1 (“The most 
common form of these intracompany IOUs are benefit pensions and deferred 
compensation.”); Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 13 (defining bank CEOs’ inside 
debt as the present value of the CEO’s pension and deferred compensation 
balances). 
 210. See Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8.  
 211. Edmans & Liu, supra note 82 (showing that the probability of default 
and the manager’s ability to affect liquidation values affect the appropriate 
amount of inside debt). 
 212. Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 4.  
 213. Tung, supra note 9, at 35 (arguing that subordinated inside debt on the 
subsidiary level is preferable to debt of the holding company for signaling). 
Contra Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2, at 273–97 (proposing to pay 
executives through debt of the bank holding company).  
 214. See supra Part V.B.2 (elaborating on the benefits of an early trigger 
design).  
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value and the associated governance benefits215 incentive 
optimization216 and reduction of agency costs217 depend on the 
solvency of the respective entity. Inside debt without a conversion 
feature provides no mechanism to ensure the solvency of the 
entity. Contingent convertible bonds with a conversion feature 
offer the additional benefit of creating an early warning system 
and a buffer before insolvency that can help an entity avoid 
default.218 As a debt instrument with an early trigger before 
conversion, contingent convertible bonds in executive 
compensation have all the benefits of inside debt219 in addition to 
the benefits of an early trigger design.220  
Because the contingent convertible bonds in executive 
compensation packages would convert into equity early before 
insolvency, the value of the equity after conversion of the 
respective executives’ contingent convertible bonds before 
bankruptcy could still be higher than the liquidation value of 
                                                                                                     
 215. Cassell et al., supra note 8, at 589 (“[O]ther studies find that inside 
debt holdings are associated with higher firm liquidation value . . . and lower 
credit default swap spreads . . . .”); Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 79; 
Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 8, at 1558; Tung, supra note 9, at 26.  
 216. Tung, supra note 9, at 3 (arguing that market pricing of inside debt is 
particularly sensitive to downside risk and that including inside debt in 
bankers’ compensation packages could therefore give managers “direct personal 
incentives to avoid excessive risk”).  
 217. Id.; see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 30; Sundaram & Yermack, 
supra note 8, at 1572 (“[D]ebt-based compensation reduces the agency costs of 
debt . . . we should observe a positive association between the CEO’s debt-to-
equity ratio and the firm’s leverage.”); Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 79 
(demonstrating that inside debt is a superior remedy to the agency costs of debt 
than the bonuses advocated by prior research).  
 218. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14 (discussing the use of contingent 
capital to create a buffer in the vicinity of bankruptcy). 
 219. See Edmans & Liu, supra note 82, at 92 (“Inside debt can be a more 
effective solution to creditor expropriation than salaries, bonuses, reputation 
and private benefits, owing to its sensitivity to liquidation value.”); Sundaram & 
Yermack, supra note 8, at 1558, 1583 (“Inside equity aligns managers with 
equity holders in good states, but inside debt aligns managers with debt-holders 
in bad states . . . . Debt-based compensation provides managers with interesting 
incentives to reduce the agency costs of debt.”); Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 
26 (“CEOs’ inside debt holdings preceding the Crisis are significantly positively 
associated with bank performance and significantly negatively associated with 
bank risk taking during the Crisis.”). 
 220. See supra Part V.B.2 (explaining the benefits of the early trigger 
design).  
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traditional inside debt.221 Unlike the liquidation value of 
traditional inside debt, the equity in executives’ portfolios after 
the conversion of the contingent convertible bonds can still be 
increased because the early trigger creates a substantial buffer 
before insolvency.222 Contingent convertible bonds as inside debt 
would not only have the benefits of inside debt before conversion, 
but would also provide significant incentives for management to 
maintain the value of equity after conversion.223 
Contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation 
could also help optimize inside debt instruments to incentivize 
lower risk-taking by managers. Similar to other inside debt 
instruments, the market price of contingent convertible bonds 
would likely be affected by managers’ risk-taking.224 Like 
subordinated inside debt on the subsidiary level,225 before 
conversion into equity, contingent convertible bonds can 
incentivize executives to lower their risk-taking because 
contingent convertible bond prices are sensitive to downside risks 
of SIFIs, including the risk of default.226 Contingent convertible 
                                                                                                     
 221. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 233–34 
A common denominator in the proposals on the use of 
contingent capital in the context of avoiding future crises could 
be the issuance of a . . . percentage of a financial institution’s 
long-term debt capital as convertible debt securities that 
convert into equity when triggered by financial weakening of 
the . . . institution. However, debt–equity conversion is not a 
new concept. The financial crisis has drawn increasing 
attention to this concept because the conversion of debt into 
equity could be an attractive alternative to forcing strained, but 
not insolvent, financial institutions into restructuring or 
liquidation. 
 222. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 293 (“Strained financial institutions may 
find the automatic conversion of debt into equity an attractive alternative to 
being forced into restructuring or liquidation.”). 
 223. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
conversion of contingent capital bonds creates incentives for managers). 
 224. See Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing the pricing sensitivity 
of inside bank debt on the subsidiary level with regard to executive risk-taking). 
Contra Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 269–74 (suggesting that 
managers’ risk-taking probably does not affect inside debt in the form of debt of 
the bank holding company to a great extent). 
 225. See Tung & Wang, supra note 8, at 35 (providing tables on 
subordinated inside debt at the subsidiary level). 
 226. See Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 140, at 6 (arguing that the 
pricing of contingent convertible bonds could be a guide to the markets’ view on 
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bonds, however, provide an additional feature. Upon the 
conversion of the contingent convertible bonds,227 the downside 
pressure on equity places additional weight on the value of the 
equity portion of executives’ pay packages.228 Upon conversion, 
the executives would not only forego the contingent convertible 
bonds in their compensation packages, but they would also hold 
converted equity and equity held prior to the conversion at a 
depressed value. The price-sensitivity-induced incentives for 
lowering risk before conversion and the new emphasis on the 
equity portion of the pay package after conversion create a 
combined effect on executives’ incentives. This combined effect 
could create comparatively stronger incentives for executives to 
take fewer risks in order to avoid the triggering event.229 The 
emphasis in this design is on incentives that lower executives’ 
risk-taking and help avoid the early trigger.230 
Critics argue that liquidity shocks and other exogenous 
factors could influence debt trading prices unrelated to managers’ 
                                                                                                     
the riskiness of financial institutions). 
 227. The conversion of contingent convertible bonds signals to the market 
that the entity could be insolvent which might result in downside pressure on 
the stock price. See Sundaresan & Wang, supra note 146, at 6 (“[C]ontingent 
capital is essentially a junior debt that converts to equity shares when the stock 
price reaches a certain low threshold.”). 
 228. See Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 140, at 6 (“But it seems 
unlikely that precautionary contingent capital could be less costly than 
equity . . . . [I]f the private information is primarily about the downside risk 
faced by a bank, the values of equity and precautionary contingent capital could 
be similarly affected by this private information.”). 
 229. See id. at 8 (“The presence of precautionary contingent capital could 
also risk creating systemic problems in other ways if bank equity holders or 
managers seek to avoid the trigger event . . . . [M]anagers could have an 
incentive to do this if they fear that conversion could lead to their 
replacement.”). Managing to avoid the triggering event alone may be possible by 
ignoring the other interests of various constituents. See id. (“If the trigger 
metric depends on a bank’s ratio of capital-to-assets or risk-weighted assets, 
incumbent equity holders or managers could try to reduce assets to push the 
ratio up and away from the trigger value.”). 
 230. Executives are unlikely to increase their risk-taking after conversion of 
their CCBs to salvage the equity value of their portfolio because of the public 
nature of the trigger, the entity’s vicinity to bankruptcy, and managers’ inability 
to obtain other forms of financing if they increase the risk profile of the entity. 
See supra Part V.C (suggesting a mandatory holding period upon the conversion 
of executives’ contingent convertible bonds for all equity in the entity the 
executives manage).  
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risk-taking, making debt at the subsidiary level less useful for 
signaling.231 Contingent convertible bonds should be less prone to 
liquidity shocks because of their inordinately high coupon rate of 
between 7% and 9.5%.232 Although there is no assurance that 
oversubscribed issuances233 guarantee future liquidity, the 
coupon rates of contingent convertible bonds could help hedge the 
liquidity risk.234  
Critics also allege that the inside debt theory of executive 
compensation ignores suboptimal short- and long-term incentives 
that may result from the inclusion of long-term debt in the 
                                                                                                     
 231. See Sepe, supra note 1, at 211 (arguing that the creditor-centered 
approach is flawed for three reasons: (1) banks’ debt obligations include, in large 
part, private debt; (2) bank-issued bonds trade at a markedly lower volume than 
bank equity; and (3) bank liabilities not included on balance sheets exist but 
their existence is difficult to demonstrate). 
 232. See Press Release, Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse Grp. Executes 
Agreement to Put in Place CHF 6 Billion of Tier 1 Buffer Capital Notes (Feb. 14, 
2011), available at https://emagazine.credit-suisse.com/app/article/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=OpenArticle&aoid=300208&coid=293554&lang=EN; Press Release, 
Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse Group Places 7.875% Tier 2 Buffer Capital Notes 
(Feb. 17, 2011), available at https://publications.credit-suisse.com/app/ 
article/index.cfm?fuseaction%20=OpenArticle&aoid=300504&coid=293551&lang=
EN (“The Tier 2 BCNs were offered on a ‘Regulation S-only’ basis outside the US 
and other restricted jurisdictions in a minimum denomination of USD 100,000. 
The USD 2 billion Tier 2 BCNs will initially carry a coupon rate of 7.875% per 
annum.”). Regarding the Barclays issuance and coupon rate, see supra notes 
134–35; see also Paul Clarke, BarCap’s 7% Coco Coupon Is Decidedly More 
Generous Than Most Deferred Bonuses, REUTERS, (Apr. 20, 2011), available at 
http://news.reuters.efinancialcareers.co.uk/News_ITEM/newsItemId-32101 (“The 
coupon rate of 7% is not just too generous for shareholders, it also outstrips the 
rate of interest being paid on most other deferred cash bonuses.”); Treanor, 
supra note 135, at 50 (“The Barclays cocos would pay a 7% coupon—or rate of 
interest—annually, not compounded.”).  
 233. See Katharina Bart, Credit Suisse Sells $2 Billion of Co-Cos to Public, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2011, 6:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704546704576150861690164484.html (“A person familiar 
with the situation said the issue was oversubscribed.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Mary Watkins, Credit Suisse to Use ‘Cocos’ to 
Raise Sfr250M, FT.COM, (Mar. 7, 2012, 6:25 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/ 
cms/s/0/e77c968c-686e-11e1-b803-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1xgvtwSc2 (“The bank 
last year raised $2bn using cocos in a heavily oversubscribed issue.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 
140, at 9 (stating that the CS issue was around eleven times oversubscribed); see 
also Kaal, supra note 14, at 312–15. 
 234. See Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 140, at 15 (explaining the 
effects of varying coupon rates). 
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compensation packages of executives.235 They argue that long-
term debt securities in the compensation packages of executives 
will not disincentivize high-risk, short-term transactions because 
managers can expect short-term gains that exceed the discounted 
value of their long-term debt securities.236 Adding contingent 
convertible bonds with early triggers as part of the inside debt 
portion of executives’ compensation packages could change 
managers’ incentives. Executives would no longer simply focus on 
the debt versus equity portion of their portfolio; they would also 
consider the effects of triggering events.237 In the day-to-day 
operation of the business, managers would need to consider the 
triggering event of a substantial portion of their outstanding debt 
instruments and the implications that a triggering event would 
have on the entity and their personal finances.238 Managing to 
avoid the early trigger would allow for enough risk-taking by 
managers to generate sufficient returns but, at the same time, 
would curtail risk-taking enough to avoid the negative effects of 
the triggering event.239 
                                                                                                     
 235. See Sepe, supra note 1, at 223 (“Accordingly, the theory overlooks the 
perverse incentives long-term debt may produce both in the short- and long-
run.”). 
 236. See id. (“Tying managers’ financial rewards to debt securities with a 
long-term maturity will not induce managers to refrain from taking risky bets in 
the short run, because the expected short-term gains from these bets will tend to 
exceed the discounted value of managers’ debt holdings.”). With equity-based 
compensation in managers’ compensation packages, managers may still be 
incentivized to drive up the stock price and exercise stock options at an 
opportune time. However, risk-taking generated by equity-based pay can be 
overcome if the calibration of debt- and equity-based compensation in the 
executive compensation package favors debt and requires a minimal holding 
period. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1, at 361–62 (discussing the equity-
based part of the compensation package). 
 237. See supra Part V.B (discussing the effects of triggering events and 
management incentives). Triggering events in contingent capital securities can 
take various forms. The debate on what triggers should be used is ongoing. See 
Kaal, supra note 14, at 300 (“While institution-specific triggers would 
presumably grant most certainty to market participants, regulatory trigger 
designs could provide lower levels of certainty.”); Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, 
at 233–38 (examining the different trigger designs and their effects on risk-
taking). 
 238. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (noting studies that explore 
how managers behave depending on the ratio of their debt to their equity). 
 239. These are ideal typical model assumptions. However, with the right 
trigger design, executives’ incentives and interests could be substantially 
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B. Improving the Creditor-Centered Approach 
Contingent convertible bonds with early triggers in executive 
compensation can help to improve the creditor-centered approach 
to executive compensation. Existing compensation practices have 
an effect on managers’ risk-taking and risk preferences as well as 
the firm’s long-term profitability and sustainability.240 Including 
                                                                                                     
improved. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 95, at 3 (“The fact that the dual-
trigger structure permits banks to sometimes fail addresses the concern that 
contingent capital would blunt the incentive effects of debt.”). 
 240. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 671 (“Unlike defined 
contribution plans, which force the employee to bear the risk of poor investment 
performance, defined benefit plans shift the risk of investment performance to 
the firm.”); Carl R. Chen, Thomas L. Steiner & Ann Marie Whyte, Does Stock 
Option-Based Executive Compensation Induce Risk-Taking? An Analysis of the 
Banking Industry, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 915, 916 (2006) (“The compensation 
level and structure employed by each bank has implications for risk-taking and 
for the agency relation between managers and stockholders.”); Jeffrey L. Coles, 
Naveen D. Daniel & Lalitha Naveen, Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking, 
79 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 442–43 (2006) (providing empirical evidence of a strong 
causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt 
policy, and firm risk); Robert Haugen & Lemma Senbet, Resolving the Agency 
Problems of External Capital Through Options, 36 J. FIN. 629, 640 (1981) 
(“[T]here may remain an incentive for the manager to engage in either high or 
low risk investment programs. This is the well-known wealth transfer problem 
associated with the existence of risky debt in the capital structure.”); Jenson & 
Meckling, supra note 30, at 309–10 (“[Existing] literature focuses almost 
exclusively on the normative aspects of the agency relationship; that is, how to 
structure the contractual relation (including compensation incentives) between 
the principal and agent to provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make 
choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare . . . .”); Kose John, Anthony 
Saunders & Lemma W. Senbet, Perspectives on Bank Capital Regulation and 
Managerial Compensation, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 735 (1995); Clifford W. Smith 
& Rene M. Stulz, The Determinants of Firms’ Hedging Policies, 20 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 391, 399 (1985) (suggesting that shareholders can affect 
management’s risk aversion through the design of compensation contracts); 
Bolton, Mehran, & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 1 (“[S]tructuring CEO incentives 
to maximize shareholder value in a levered firm tends to encourage excess risk 
taking.”); COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, TOP 10 RED FLAGS TO WATCH 
FOR WHEN CASTING AN ADVISORY VOTE ON EXECUTIVE PAY 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/publications/March%202010
%20-%20Say%20on%20Pay%20Checklist.pdf (“Poorly-designed incentives can 
promote excessive risk-taking and get-rich quick mentalities—key contributors 
to the financial crisis.”). Several empirical studies have explored the connection 
between managerial stock, option holdings, or both, and financial strategy or 
corporate focus (such as leverage, repurchase, or the extent of derivatives usage 
and hedging). See generally Anup Agrawal & Gershon Mandelker, Managerial 
Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions, 42 J. FIN. 823 
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in executive compensation packages a basket of securities that 
represents a predefined percentage of the common shares could 
help address the shortcomings of existing executive compensation 
practices.241  
Adding contingent convertible bonds to the basket of 
securities in executive compensation could further improve 
executive compensation practices. Like other debt securities in 
executive compensation, contingent convertible bonds may 
increase sustainability and can help overcome income 
inequality.242 If a SIFI issues contingent convertible bonds to 
                                                                                                     
(1987); Philip G. Berger, Eli Ofek & David L. Yermack, Managerial 
Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions, 52 J. FIN. 1411 (1997); Richard 
A. DeFusco, Robert R. Johnson & Thomas S. Zorn, The Effect of Executive Stock 
Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617 (1990); David J. 
Denis, Diane K. Denis & Atulya Sarin, Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and 
Corporate Diversification, 52 J. FIN. 135 (1997); Wayne R. Guay, The Sensitivity 
of CEO Wealth to Equity Risk: An Analysis of the Magnitude and Determinants, 
53 J. FIN. ECON. 43 (1999); Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure, 
Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 163 (1995); Hamid Mehran, 
Executive Incentive Plans, Corporate Control, and Capital Structure, 27 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 539 (1992); Daniel A. Rogers, Does Executive Portfolio 
Structure Affect Risk Management? CEO Risk-Taking Incentives and Corporate 
Derivatives Usage, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 271 (2002); Catherine Schrand & Haluk 
Unal, Hedging and Coordinating Risk Management: Evidence from Thrift 
Conversions, 53 J. FIN. 979 (1998); Peter Tufano, Who Manages Risk? An 
Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining 
Industry, 51 J. FIN. 1097 (1996); Christine Jolls, Stock Repurchases and 
Incentive Compensation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
w6467, 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
226212. 
 241. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 253, 283–84 (discussing how 
executive compensation packages are one of several corporate governance 
measures that address excessive risk-taking and how regulating such incentives 
should be standard procedure in the future). Weighting debt securities, 
including contingent convertible bonds, heavily in the calibration of executive 
compensation packages may increase the positive effects of debt in executive 
compensation packages. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (expounding 
on the positive effects). At the same time, debt may not be the preferred form of 
compensation for executives. Calibrating executive compensation packages to 
account for desired incentives and governance improvements while giving 
sufficient incentives for executives to perform within expected parameters may 
require an institution-specific relational approach and learning from experience. 
See supra Part IV (discussing the benefits of the incomplete contract theory of 
NIE). 
 242. See Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: H.R. 1257, 
the Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on. Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 129 (2007) (testimony of Steven N. Kaplan, 
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replace a substantial portion of its executives’ equity-based 
compensation, the coupon rate of contingent convertible bonds 
(between 7% and 9.5%),243 albeit higher than traditional debt 
instruments, could help address concerns over income 
inequality.244 For the remaining portion of executives’ equity-
based compensation, a mandatory holding period upon the 
conversion of the contingent convertible bonds could provide 
incentives for sustainability.245 The coupon rate of contingent 
convertible bonds may be incomparable with the upside potential 
of equity-based compensation, especially for stock options. The 
coupon rate of contingent convertible bonds, however, is higher 
than the coupon rate of traditional debt instruments.246 This 
                                                                                                     
Neubauer Family Professor of Entrepreneurship & Fin., Univ. of Chi., Graduate 
Sch. of Bus.) (“[T]he increase in CEO pay is a factor in the increase in income 
inequality at the very top end of the income distribution. It is not, however, the 
driver of that inequality.”); McDonnell, supra note 189, at 1 (elaborating on 
general inequality as a concern); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income 
Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 32 (2003) (“Part of 
the recent increase in top wages is due to the development of stock options that 
are reported as wages and salaries on tax returns when they are exercised.”); 
Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration: Where 
We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 
24 (Eur. Corporate Gov’t Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=561305 (“The pay for chief 
executive officers (CEOs) in large US firms increased dramatically over the past 
three decades, driven by an explosion in grants of share options.”); Steven N. 
Kaplan & Joshua D. Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the 
Rise in the Highest Incomes? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 13270, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=931280 
Inequality today at the top end of the income distribution can 
be attributed to four different sectors of the economy—top 
executives of non-financial firms (Main Street); financial 
service sector employees from investment banks, hedge funds, 
private equity funds, and mutual funds (Wall Street); lawyers; 
and professional athletes and celebrities. 
 243. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (describing Credit Suisse 
issuance statistics).  
 244. See supra Part V (discussing how the governance-improving features of 
contingent capital bonds can be applied to executive compensation); supra note 
188 and accompanying text (explaining that contingent convertible bonds can 
lower income inequality and increase sustainability). 
 245. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1, at 361 (suggesting a two- to four-
year holding period for equity-based compensation). 
 246. See Markus Pelger, Contingent Convertible Bonds: Pricing, Dilution 
Costs and Effective Regulation 7–11 (Coleman Fung Risk Mgmt. Research Ctr., 
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higher coupon rate could make it a more attractive instrument in 
executive compensation.247 The attractive features of CCBs may 
help establish CCBs in the executive compensation culture in the 
United States and thereby improve corporate governance. 
Because of the conversion feature, contingent convertible 
bonds may have additional benefits. Unlike traditional debt 
instruments in executive compensation, contingent convertible 
bonds provide incentives for increased monitoring by creditors 
and shareholders. They also align executives’ interests with the 
interests of shareholders and creditors.248 Most importantly, 
adding contingent convertible bonds or replacing other debt 
instruments in executive compensation packages with contingent 
convertible bonds with early triggers helps improve managers’ 
risk incentives.249 The conversion feature of contingent 
convertible bonds decreases executives’ risk-taking incentives 
because holding a substantial portion of debt rather than equity 
disincentivizes short-termism and executives’ focus on quarterly 
stock price performance. The early conversion feature also creates 
a risk that if executives do not lower their risk-taking and 
manage the entity well enough to avoid the trigger, they will 
receive equity at a point in time when the equity value will be 
substantially diminished.250 
                                                                                                     
Working Paper No. 2012-02, 2012), http://fungcenter.berkeley.edu/resources/ 
documents/Pelger201202.pdf (providing formulae for calculating coupon rates of 
both contingent convertible bonds and traditional debt instruments). 
 247. See Murphy, Walsh & Willison, supra note 140, at 7 (“The opportunity 
to run before conversion could also reduce the incentives of precautionary 
contingent capital holders to monitor a bank’s risk-taking and impose market 
discipline.”). 
 248. See supra Part V (discussing how, because shareholders’ interests are 
aligned with the entity’s, executives’ interests are also aligned with the 
shareholders’ interests). 
 249. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (examining the effect of 
contingent convertible bonds on managers’ risk-taking). 
 250. The amount to be received upon conversion would depend on the trigger 
design. Most triggers currently discussed in the literature favor a conversion 
shortly before bankruptcy. If this is the case, the equity received by executives 
would be nearly worthless. If the SIFI chooses a contingent capital bond design 
with a write-down feature for its executive compensation packages, managers 
would perhaps have even less incentive to take risks because they would not get 
any financial benefit from the contingent capital bonds if they are triggered into 
a write-down. The beneficial effects could increase in proportion to the volume of 
contingent convertible bonds issued to executives.  
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Replacing a substantial portion of equity-based compensation 
with contingent convertible bonds can also help create incentives 
for managers to keep the business solvent. During the Financial 
Crisis, Lehman Brothers experienced a severe shortfall in 
solvency in part because its CEO Richard S. Fuld, Jr. had a 
substantial equity stake in the company and, in an effort to 
preserve his own interests, refused to pursue a dilutive capital 
infusion or sell the firm in order to avoid the firm’s failure (the 
Fuld Problem).251 Motivated in part by a desire to address the 
Fuld Problem, Jeffrey Gordon suggests using convertible, equity-
based pay to compensate executives.252 For example, executives in 
financial firms would receive a substantial part of their stock-
related compensation in equity securities that convert to 
subordinated debt upon a triggering event.253 Gordon contrasts 
convertible equity-based pay with contingent convertible bonds 
and argues that contingent convertible bonds would not address 
the Fuld Problem.254  
If a financial institution issues contingent convertible bonds 
to the general public and its executives, and a large part of 
equity-based executive compensation is replaced with CCBs,255 
SIFI managers may be more concerned with managing the entity 
to prevent the early triggering event256 than with averting an 
                                                                                                     
 251. See Executive Compensation, supra note 19, at 7 (“This might be called 
‘the Fuld Problem’: a CEO who is reluctant to negotiate a large equity raise (or 
sell the firm) because the terms would massively dilute his personal equity 
stake and who instead may calculate that holding out [will be more beneficial to 
him or her].”). 
 252. See id. at 11 (“[S]enior executives at financial firms should receive a 
significant portion of stock-related compensation in the form of equity that will 
convert into subordinated debt upon certain external triggering events . . . .”). 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. at 11 n.18 (“Convertible equity-based pay bears a family 
resemblance to ‘contingent convertible bonds’ . . . . Among other features, ‘co-cos’ 
promote shareholder monitoring of managerial risk-taking by providing a 
credible threat of dilution in the event of financial distress . . . .”). 
 255. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 321 (discussing how Credit Suisse and other 
SIFIs have already issued contingent convertible bonds to the public); see also 
supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting that Barclays has already issued 
contingent convertible bonds to its executives). 
 256. See supra Part V.C (explaining how SIFI executives might be led to 
manipulate triggering events if they are compensated with contingent 
convertible bonds). 
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equity infusion to avoid dilution of their own equity stake. If 
executives’ compensation packages do not include a large equity 
portion, managers have no incentive to avoid an equity infusion 
to preserve the value of their own equity.257 Even if a substantial 
portion of executives’ compensation remains equity-based, the 
early conversion of contingent convertible bonds affects not only 
the debt portion of executives’ compensation but also the value of 
the equity portion after the contingent convertible bonds portion 
is converted.258 The lower value of the equity portion after the 
conversion of the contingent convertible bonds, in combination 
with the negative impact of the CCBS conversion on the existing 
equity of the respective entity, makes it less likely that executives 
will fear the effect of raising additional equity, such as a negative 
impact on price and the dilutive effect.259  
Because contingent convertible bonds are addressed to the 
entire equity base and would, according to some proposals, 
become a (mandatory) feature of SIFIs’ balance sheets, the 
dilution and the effect on managers could be greater with 
convertible equity-based pay.260 However, the effect of the 
                                                                                                     
 257. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1, at 272 (“[T]he holder of [an out-
of-the-money] option will be indifferent between a stable stock price and further 
losses of any magnitude. On the upside, only very large stock price gains will 
yield a positive payoff for the option holder.”). 
 258. See supra Part V.B (examining the consequences of an early conversion 
of contingent convertible bonds and the effects of such conversion on executives’ 
risk-taking). Opportunism may lead managers to increase the risk profile of the 
entity after conversion, enabling them to regain the lost equity value in their 
portfolio. On the other hand, an increase in the risk profile would affect the 
ability of the entity to obtain other forms of financing such as bridge loans. The 
increase in the risk profile after conversion is also unlikely because the early 
conversion would probably increase CCBs investors’ and shareholders’ 
monitoring of the entity. See Executive Compensation, supra note 19, at 11 n.18 
(“Among other features, ‘co-cos’ promote shareholder monitoring of managerial 
risk-taking by providing a credible threat of dilution in the event of financial 
distress, because of the automatic conversion of a significant amount of debt into 
equity.”). 
 259. See id. at 11 (“The equity will convert into subordinated debt based on 
the value of the converted equity as of a period prior to the conversion 
moment . . . . This mechanism both imposes losses on senior management for 
deterioration in the firm’s financial condition while giving it a significant stake 
in avoiding further deterioration.”). 
 260. See id. at 11 n.18 (“Assuming that anti-dilution protection is scrubbed 
out of managerial compensation contracts, the dilution threat from co-co’s 
should also directly affect management behavior.”). 
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conversion from equity to debt will largely depend on the trigger 
design. There is currently no consensus on the ideal trigger 
design for convertible securities.261 Depending on the trigger 
design, a mandatory conversion of senior managers’ equity into 
subordinated debt on a valuation basis may not lead to a 
significant loss if the trigger from equity to subordinated debt 
comes after a likely significant loss in the share price of the 
entity.262 Although mandatory contingent convertible bond 
issuances with predefined triggering events could have better 
corporate governance outcomes,263 it is noteworthy that the 
contingent convertible bond market has evolved without 
mandatory issuances.264 Also, the Fuld Problem265 is only one of 
many corporate governance concerns pertaining to SIFIs.266 The 
approach in this Article is broader.267 The issuance of contingent 
convertible bonds to the public has great potential to improve 
several aspects of corporate governance in SIFIs.268 Contingent 
                                                                                                     
 261. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 300–01 (describing how different trigger 
designs pose different problems); see also Henkel & Kaal, supra note 149, at 
251–57 (showing the uncertainty and risk involved in the different trigger 
designs).  
 262. See Executive Compensation, supra note 19, at 16 (“[A] mandatory 
conversion of senior managers’ equity into subordinated debt on valuation 
basis . . . [can] impose[] an immediate loss but . . . also [may] preserve[] 
incentives to prevent further deterioration of the firm.”). 
 263. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 317 (“The experimentation with different 
CCS rules and a mixture of market solutions, private ordering, and mandatory 
rules in different jurisdictions could help avoid a ‘stable rule’ and permit 
dynamic regulation.”). 
 264. See id. at 308–12 (discussing the evolving market in contingent capital). 
 265. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (defining “the Fuld 
Problem”). 
 266. Another similar problem is that “the incentives originating from 
corporate governance controls may not work in SIFIs.” Kaal & Henkel, supra 
note 14, at 242. 
 267. The common denominator between Gordon’s proposal and the proposal 
in this Article is the avoidance of SIFI resolution and distress in the financial 
sector. Compare Executive Compensation, supra note 19, at 2 (focusing instead 
on the ever-widening gap between executives’ interests and those of 
nonmanagerial shareholders), with supra notes 240–44 and accompanying text 
(examining contingent corporate bonds’ effect on risk-taking and income 
inequality). 
 268. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 321–22 (“While commercial motives are 
certain to have played a major role in the CCS issuance by Credit Suisse and 
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convertible bonds in executive compensation can solidify, and in 
some cases, intensify the positive effects on corporate 
governance.269 
C. The Impact of Ownership Characteristics on Trigger Design 
The literature on trigger designs of contingent capital focuses 
on the efficient calibration of triggering events.270 The efficient 
calibration of triggering events is central to the design of 
contingent capital because the trigger affects if and when the 
conversion of contingent convertible bonds takes place.271 The 
efficient conversion of contingent convertible bonds into equity 
has substantial implications for the effectiveness of contingent 
convertible bonds and their ability to make financial institutions 
safer.272  
The literature on contingent capital trigger designs is largely 
silent regarding the effect of trigger designs on corporate 
governance.273 Contingent convertible bonds issued to 
                                                                                                     
Barclays, the use of contingent capital to avoid public sector support and to 
compensate executives could be a first step towards corporate governance 
reform from within, with potentially larger implications.”). 
 269. See supra Part V.B (explaining how contingent convertible bonds that 
specifically include an early trigger design may optimize the effects on corporate 
governance). 
 270. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 149, at 251–52 (“The efficient 
calibration of triggering events is central to the design of contingent 
capital. . . . Scholars discuss various trigger events that may be categorized as 
follows: (1) transactional triggers, (2) automatic triggers, (3) statutory triggers, 
and (4) regulatory triggers.”); Kaal, supra note 14, at 298–99 (“The optimal 
design of CCS has been the subject of a long academic debate. Unresolved 
questions include design features of CCS and the calibration of design features, 
the mandatory or voluntary nature of contingent capital, the objectives of CCS, 
market evolution, and the volume of CCS issuance, among others.”). 
 271. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 149, at 251 (“The efficient calibration of 
triggering events is central to the design of contingent capital. The optimal 
design for a trigger event that converts debt into equity is unclear.”). 
 272. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 224–25 (“Contingent capital is the 
predefined conversion of financial institutions’ debt securities upon a triggering 
event into equity securities. Pending contingent capital proposals are expected 
to make financial institutions more resilient and avoid a future financial 
crisis.”). 
 273. See Kaal, supra note 14, at 300–01 (discussing the potential benefits 
and drawbacks of trigger designs, but not addressing trigger designs’ effect on 
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executives274 place a new emphasis on the impact of ownership 
characteristics on trigger designs. Trigger designs that may work 
well in financial institutions with the traditional mix of debt-
holders and shareholders may be suboptimal if executives also 
hold debt instruments in the form of contingent convertible 
bonds.275 The nature of ownership of contingent convertible bonds 
may create different demands on the design features. Who owns 
the contingent convertible bonds can impact the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and corporate governance results of trigger 
designs.276 Recognizing that ownership characteristics can have 
an impact on the efficient design of contingent capital triggers 
can help adjust designs and avoid suboptimal outcomes.277 
VII. Conclusion 
Contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation are 
not a mere theoretical concept. European SIFIs have started to 
add contingent convertible bonds to executive compensation 
packages.278 Path dependencies could make it difficult to adopt 
governance-improving elements in executive compensation 
policies in the United States.279 Contingent convertible bonds 
display many commercially attractive features that could help 
establish these hybrid securities in the compensation packages of 
executives in the United States. Like other debt securities in 
executive compensation, contingent convertible bonds can lower 
income inequality and incentivize the long-term and sustainable 
                                                                                                     
corporate governance). 
 274. See supra note 134 and Part V.A (reviewing Barclays’s issuance of 
contingent convertible bonds to executives).  
 275. Kaal & Henkel, supra note 14, at 301.  
 276. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 149, at 252 (“Constituents favor 
trigger designs in accordance with their own utility preferences.”). 
 277. Adjusting the design of CCBs to take ownership characteristics into 
account could complicate this analysis, which already deals with a substantial 
number of parameters. However, the design of CCBs should not be compromised 
in order to avoid complexity. 
 278. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing Barclays’s use of 
contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation). 
 279. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (identifying path 
dependence as an obstacle to the adoption of contingent convertible bonds in the 
United States). 
CONTINGENT CAPITAL 1889 
development of SIFIs.280 Additionally, an early trigger design for 
contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation can help 
further improve governance shortcomings in SIFIs.281 Contingent 
convertible bonds with an early trigger design enable earlier 
signaling of default risk; they provide increased incentives for 
monitoring by creditors and shareholders as well as incentives for 
executives to lower their risk-taking.282 
  
                                                                                                     
 280. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (explaining that if 
contingent convertible bonds replace equity-based executive compensation, 
contingent convertible bonds may lower income inequality). 
 281. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text (expanding on the 
benefits of an early trigger design). 
 282. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing how early 
trigger designs can incentivize creditors and shareholders to monitor executives’ 
risk-taking). 
